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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON “DOING CARE”, GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE WORK 
DAY, AND WOMEN’S CARE WORK IN THE HOUSEHOLD  
 
SEPTEMBER 2017 
 
AVANTI MUKHERJEE, B.Sc., MAR IVANIOS COLLEGE  
 
M.A., M.Phil, JAWAHRLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Nancy Folbre 
 
 
This dissertation provides a theoretical perspective on why women’s 
responsibility for care work lengthens their workday relative to men due to subsistence 
requirements, and draws attention to the relevance of other female family members.  
Building from theories of institutional bargaining research insights from “doing gender”, 
I develop a theoretical perspective on “doing care” that considers both bargaining power 
and social norms as determinants of differences in time allocation across and within 
gender. Conventional bargaining models predict that women who earn incomes can 
substitute hours of paid work for unpaid work. Using qualitative field work from India, 
and my theory of “doing care”, I argue, that women have limited ability to trade income-
earning work for care work by persuading their husbands to do more. The immediacy of 
family needs and	  strong cultural obligations compel women to devote time to care work. 
This is particularly evident among the Adivasi (a low income social group with less 
binding gender norms than other groups), especially their ability to do less care work. 
Older women are also able to reduce care work with the presence of younger women, 
especially daughters-in-laws. In households without a co-resident daughter-in-law, the 
presence of older daughters lightens mother’s hours of direct and indirect care more than 
the presence of older sons. In this regard, I build on the work of Barcellos, Carvalho and 
Muney (2014), which examines whether sons receive more childcare than daughters, by 
considering how “doing care” complicates the occurrence of son preference in practice. 
As daughters may provide their mothers with more assistance with care work than sons, 
mothers’ in particular may not be as swayed by son preference in the allocation of time to 
care. Results from multivariate regression using information of married couples' as well 
as of mothers’ without co-resident daughters-in-law from the Indian Time Use Survey 
1998-99 confirms my hypotheses. My results indicates that research on women’s care 
work in South Asia as well as on parents' differential treatment of boys and girls in terms 
of care-giving needs to consider the reliance of women on daughters-in-law and 
daughters respectively. 
	  
Keywords: Gender, Care, Intra-household Allocation of time, Son Preference 	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CHAPTER 1 
 
“DOING CARE” - INTRA-HOUSEHOLD DIFFERENCES IN TIME SPENT ON 
WORK AND CARE IN RURAL INDIA  
 
Introduction 
The gender division of labor within households is typically unequal with women 
shouldering a bulk of care work and working longer hours than men. At the same time, 
there are differences among women in a household depending on their age, and 
relationship to household head, as well as the number and gender of children.  The 
increased availability of time use data offers the scope to examine such intra-household 
inequalities in the allocation of time use. Research using such data has largely been 
descriptive, measuring the patterns and trends in gender differences in time spent on paid 
and unpaid work, especially on unpaid care. Time use research that investigates women's 
substitutability of care work for income-earning work, or just women's ability to reduce 
care work per se is pertinent to understand unequal intra-household allocation of time; 
but such research is sparse and largely focused on developed areas such as the US, 
Australia and Europe. 
 In this paper, I critically examine the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
intra-household allocation of time to motivate a set of hypotheses on gender differences 
in total work hours and women's time spent on care work that can be tested with time-use 
data. In the next section, I offer a critical review of the theoretical literature on gender 
inequality within households. The previously held assumption that households make joint 
decisions based on efficiency considerations has been displaced by two very different 
approaches. At one extreme, household bargaining models focus on the lack of access to 
market earnings, (which hinder women's fallback position) with little reference to social 
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norms. At the other extreme, sociological theories of “doing gender” focus entirely on 
normative pressures related to gender with little attention to others factors. Time-use data 
offer one way to empirically examine these approaches and measure the extent to which 
women can reduce their care and total work hours. However, it also raises a number of 
conceptual and methodological issues. I explore these issues in the third section, where I 
also summarize descriptive results that are relevant to theories of household time 
allocation, and illustrate the scope to explore the intra-household allocation of time, with 
particular attention to women's household chores and child care. In the fourth section, I 
make the case for a theoretical perspective based on “doing care”, which considers both 
bargaining power and social norms as determinants of gender differences in time 
allocation. Next, I describe ways in which this perspective can be illustrated via mixed 
methods approach combining time-use data from rural India and qualitative data: (1) the 
cultural assignment of women to care work in the South Asian context limits women's 
ability to trade income-earning work for care work by persuading their husbands to do 
more; (2) Older women have the power to delegate care work to younger women, 
daughters-in-law; and (3), in households without a co-resident daughter-in-law, the 
presence of older daughters lightens mother's hours of direct and indirect care more than 
the presence of older sons. The extent to which women can reduce their total and care 
work hours given their income-earning hours and the presence of other family members 
are tested in the next two dissertation essays.   
Unequal intra-household allocation 
Household allocation of labor time and resources tends to be unequal with women 
devoting time to paid work in addition to care work (Charmes 2015). There is also 
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evidence that they receive lower shares of expenditures on nutrition, health care and 
education than men (Kaur 2008, Alderman and Gertler 1997, Lise and Seitz 2011, Pitt, 
Rosenzweig and Hassan 1990). Whereas some theories of intra-household allocation 
explain such outcomes in terms of joint utility maximization, others emphasize 
bargaining over gains from cooperation, and yet others, the role of norms and other 
institutions in household bargaining.  
Unitary household models 
 Unitary models assume that households behave as a single entity, pooling 
incomes, labor and other resources, intent on maximizing household earnings and/or 
production. Unequal outcomes such as the distribution of food within households are the 
result of achieving efficiency. For instance, if men earn higher wages or perform more 
physically strenuous work such as ploughing a field, then in times of scarcity women 
allocate more food to men to ensure they get the requisite calories to perform the physical 
labor necessary to expand household production or earnings (Pitt, Rosenzweig and 
Hassan 1990, Alderman et al 1995). Another example is Becker's model. Household 
interests are assumed to be homogenized by an altruistic (male) household head who 
allocates labor time and resources to maximize household incomes and goods produced 
in the household. All other household members, women and children, are self interested, 
and therefore cooperate with the household head in allocation of time to care work and 
other work to maximize what would constitute their share of the household surplus 
(Becker 1981).  
 While efficiency can explain specialization, it does not explain why women work 
longer hours overall. The assumption of household income pooling, or of male 
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altruism/female self-interestedness also runs counter to the empirical evidence that 
households do not necessarily pool incomes, or that men are more likely to be spending 
on their own consumption such as tobacco and alcohol and women on health care and 
education of children (Alderman et al 1995, Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman 1997). It is 
also not convincing that women 'voluntarily' give up food, education and leisure when 
they are typically not in a position to demand their fair share  (Folbre 1986).  
Household bargaining models 
 Bargaining models assume heterogeneous preferences and explicitly theorize 
conflict within households to explain inequality in intra-household outcomes.  If there are 
gains to be reaped from cooperation over labor time and sharing resources within 
households, there are also potential conflicts over how these gains should be divided such 
as who does household chores and who gets to enjoy more leisure. Conflicts are resolved 
in favor of those members who have the strongest fallback i.e. the alternative set of 
outcomes if cooperation fails. In so-called “collective models”, households make efficient 
decisions, but weight the preferences of their members differently in ways that reflect 
relative bargaining power (Chiappori 1992, 1997). In the divorce threat model, the spouse 
who has a lower fallback has more to lose from divorce will perform more household 
labor to access material support (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981). 
In the separate spheres model, the fallback is when each spouse retreats to their 
respective spheres of household production and market production (earning an income) 
and do not make voluntary contributions to shared goods. In this case, there is no exit 
from marriage, but the spouse without access to earnings has more to lose from non-
cooperation (Lundberg and Pollak 1993).  
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 These bargaining models that emphasize the role of paid work participation 
and/or wage rates are similar to sociological theories of relative resources and 
dependency. By the relative resources perspective, the spouse with relatively higher 
education and/or earnings has more "power" than the other in avoiding domestic chores 
such as cooking, cleaning etc (Bianchi et al 2000). The dependency theory suggests that 
the spouse that is more dependent on the other spouse for economic support will provide 
household labor in return for the support (Brines 1994). In all these theories, each spouse 
is advocating for their own interests, which is to do less work while getting more out of 
cooperation. The gender of the spouse does not matter, only the fallback position or 
degree of dependency or access to resources. 
Problematizing “rationality” 
 Sen's cooperative-conflict model illustrates how preferences, or interests, are not 
exogenous. Eschewing optimizing techniques, he argues that perceived interests and 
perceived contributions also influence the bargaining process in addition to fallback 
positions. Women will bargain for their interests to the extent they perceive their own 
self-interests as distinct from others' in the household, and perceive their own unpaid 
contributions as valuable to the household. At the same time, if their husbands' or other 
household members take women's contributions for granted, women's bargaining power 
is bound to be weaker (Sen 1990). In other words, there is an implicit argument that 
women's gender identity affects their perception and hence whether they bargain for their 
own interests. In this respect, Sen anticipates the economics of identity arguments put 
forward by Akerlof and Kranton; individual’s perceptions of costs and benefits are 
affected by a sense of deviation from one's ascribed identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).  
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Both Sen and Akerlof and Kranton argue that preferences are dependent on people's 
gender, race or other axes of identity, but do not have a theory on how preferences are 
shaped by identity. 
Norms, “doing gender” and institutional bargaining 	   The social construction of gender as an identity has been theorized as some 
degree of conscious adoption of traits, rules and expectations related to one's sex rather 
than an automatic internalization of norms. By "doing gender", West and Zimmerman 
present an argument where gender is the product of "social doings" and not just a set of 
traits, and roles (1987:129). Gender is an ongoing activity in everyday interactions, where 
individuals are accountable to others in their interactions and in their social milieus for 
presenting as female/feminine and male/masculine (West and Zimmerman 1987, 2009). 
Thus, an individual who is biologically female could earn more than her husband but still 
feels accountable in her social context for being 'unfeminine', and therefore may 
compensate by increasing their time spent on housework and child care (Bittman et al 
2003) 
 West and Zimmerman focus on norms and not enough on other institutional 
factors, and their broad focus on norms of gender pays insufficient attention to how norm 
and rules related to care-giving per se affect the performance of gender. Norms and other 
institutional factors influence bargaining power, and in turn institutional factors including 
norms and bargaining are relevant to understanding intra-household inequality (McElroy 
1990, 1992; Folbre 1994). Indeed, there is evidence that both bargaining and “doing 
gender” shape the allocation of spouses' time to household chores (Bittman et al 2003). 
Norms and rules that favor men itself may be bargained over through women's active 
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advocacy in elder/caste councils or resistance within households (Agarwal 1997, 
Kandiyoti 1988). On the other hand, women can also engage in covert acts of resistance 
and/or  strike “patriarchal bargains” where they strategize to maximize their security by 
reinforcing gender norms over younger women such as daughters-in-law (Kandiyoti 
1988, Kaur 2008). While such institutional and individual processes are consistent with 
West and Zimmerman's ideas of “doing” and “redoing” gender in everyday practices and 
interactions, institutional bargaining is distinct by explicitly considering women's agency 
in advocating for their self-interest within given institutional constraints.  
Several social institutions such as informal customs, formal rules, laws, and 
access to resources influence the asymmetrical bargaining power by gender (McElroy 
1990, 1992; Folbre 1994). For instance, individual bargaining power gained from having 
land or property tend to be more relevant in rural, developing country contexts (Katz 
1991, Agarwal 1997). Marital contracts, inheritance rules, or taxation systems can either 
weaken or strengthen women's bargaining power by shaping their access to resources, 
and reinforcing certain roles and obligations (McElroy 1990, 1992, Kabeer 1999, 
Braunstein and Folbre 2001).  
 These examples also help to illustrate how institutions shape bargaining power 
both at the individual and group levels, and in particular how the assignment of child care 
to women puts them in a weaker position as a gender (Folbre 1994, Bagett and Folbre 
1999). The absence of land rights limits the bargaining power of specific groups of 
people such as landless laborers and/or women, not just the individual bargaining power 
of persons who do not own or have access to land. Rules and laws governing marriage 
and inheritance systems also define rights given to each gender, assigns responsibilities, 
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or in some cases allows men to evade certain responsibilities. For instance, while marital 
contracts in Anglo-American law have traditionally given husbands explicit rights of 
control over their wives' bodies, property, products of labor including minor children, 
husband's support of their wives and children were neither clearly defined, nor was a 
wife's claim on her husband's wealth and earnings enforceable (Braunstein and Folbre 
2001). Even as feminist advocacy have modified legal inequalities, the provision of child 
support and/or alimony has been difficult to enforce (Hunter 1983). In general, the 
cultural assignment of childcare to women flows from a complex of institutional factors 
and results in weaker bargaining power for women, as they have to devote time and 
resources caring for children. 
Time use studies on women and men's work days 
 Diary-based time-use data collected from nationally representative surveys 
provide invaluable insights into the intra-household allocation of labor time to various 
categories of work. Effective utilization of this data requires attention to a number of 
important definitional, conceptual and methodological issues.  Patterns and trends of 
time-use in developed and developing countries illustrate the continuity of care and 
household work as women's work as well as the distinct nature of such work in rural, 
developing country contexts. Whereas research that test hypotheses using time-use data 
from developed countries find evidence for both bargaining and “doing gender” 
approaches, other studies from developing countries strongly indicate that it may be 
difficult for women to persuade their husbands to do more care work and that the division 
of care and household work is between women and their daughters-in-law and daughters. 
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Commonly used definitions of work 
 
 Reid's third party criterion defines works as any activity that can be potentially 
delegated to a third person for pay, or otherwise (Reid 1934). The principle of potential 
delegation of in Reid's criterion is close to Ironmongers definition of work as any activity 
that yields transferable benefits (Folbre and Yoon 2008) 
 Researchers studying gender differences in work in developing countries tend to 
use categories of work in relation to the system of national accounts (SNA) because the 
SNA provides global guidelines on the definition of work and includes subsistence and 
informal work. The SNA, however, has historically relied on a distinction of whether 
activities produce goods and services for sale, or not (Anker 1983, Beneria 1999 
Mukherjee 2009). The most current production boundary limits 'economic activities' to 
production and processing of goods and services performed for incomes, production of 
goods for own consumption and the maintenance, and/or construction of own dwellings 
(Mukherjee, forthcoming). SNA work thus includes all types of agricultural and allied 
production, regardless of whether it is for the market or home consumption, including 
subsistence tasks such as fetching water.  Yet, it arbitrarily excludes services such as 
cooking, cleaning and direct care for own household members (Anker 1983, Charmes 
2006, Mukherjee 2009, Budlender 2008, Hirway 2010).  Researchers studying time 
allocation from a feminist perspective use the categories of SNA and extended SNA 
work, where extended SNA includes services for own consumption i.e. tasks such as 
household maintenance, cooking, the direct care of children and so on.1 While SNA and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Within the set of all activities that constitute work by the third party criterion, the partition between SNA 
and extended SNA work is not the same as those between market and non-market work, or paid and unpaid 
work. Charmes (2006) has a useful three-way classification table that shows how SNA work includes both 
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extended SNA work are consistent with the third party criterion at the level of definition, 
there are underlying conceptual differences. 
Conceptual issues: Does care constitute “work”, or “caring labor”? 
 The conceptual underpinning of Reid’s third party criterion is one of potential 
delegation or transferability of benefits. The SNA conceptualization of work is in terms 
of activities for pay, and/or production for the market, which is based on conventional 
theories of labor supply that are rooted in subjective motivations. Work is undertaken for 
pay that provides sufficient utility to balance the disutility of foregoing leisure, and 
leisure is undertaken for its intrinsic pleasure. Work associated with production for the 
home and family is not included in pay-based or disutility-based definition of work, and 
may be lumped in with leisure. In contrast, Reid's third party criterion would 
unambiguously treat activities related to care as work. 
 Nevertheless, Reid's criterion has been criticized on the grounds that it has a 
market bias with the potential to undervalue care (Himmelweit 1995, Wood 2007). Care 
has been used to refer to both caring activities as well as caring motivations such as 
concern for others, and altruism (Folbre and Nelson 2000). For instance, there is the 
concept of "caring labor", which refers to caring provided face-to-face, and intrinsic 
motivations shaped by an emotional attachment, or connection between caregiver and 
care-recipient. This is different from activities driven by extrinsic motivations such as 
pay rates (Badgett and Folbre 1999). Such intrinsic motivations are important to assure a 
certain quality of care and hence for the well being of dependents.  Critiques of a market-
centered understanding and definitions of care, especially with respect to policy-making, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
market and non-market, and also paid and unpaid work. Extended SNA work are all unpaid and non-
marketed housework and direct care (See Figure 3.1, pg 43)	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emerge from concerns that extrinsic motivations for pay, or other utilitarian 
considerations would either crowd out intrinsic caring motivations, and in turn the quality 
of care provided (Himmelweit 1995; Folbre and Nelson 2000).  However, intrinsic 
motivations and emotional attachment also develop in the context of paid care work such 
as care providers for children, elderly and other types of dependents, nurses, and teachers 
(Himmelweit 1999, England 2005). While this is similar to “emotional labor” or the 
management of feelings and emotions to create a certain type of bodily and affective 
display such as by air hostesses, waitresses, and retail workers, not all emotional labor is 
caring labor because of the transitory nature between service providers and clients  
(Hoschild 1983, Himmelweit 1999). 
 While the conceptual priority given to caring labor is relevant to reveal the quality 
of care and the undervaluation paid care in markets, it deflects attention from the nature 
and quantity of indirect forms of care that women in developing countries engage in to 
provide the basic necessities of water, fuel and food for their families. Even when 
affective relationships form a significant motivation for why women engage in physically 
onerous types of care such as carrying heavy loads of firewood for miles, such tasks 
would be experienced as work (Mukherjee 2009). Indeed, the same person can 
subjectively experience childcare as work and as non-work depending on activity, time of 
day and context, even in western, industrialized countries (Folbre and Yoon 2008).2 This 
makes motivations a	   difficult metric to use when the aim of research is to explain 
differences in time spent on work by women and men, and among different groups of 
women.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Spending time with a happy, calm child has intrinsic pleasure but taking care of a sick, cranky, child at 2 
am in the morning would be tiresome and may be experienced as work (Folbre 2010)	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Methods to measure work and care 
 The diary method is widely considered the best survey instrument to measure time 
use and is widely used (outside of Latin America).3 Research on time use for more than 
forty years show that the diary method tends to have greater validity and reliability 
compared to stylized questions (Bittman and Wajcman 2000, Budlender 2010).  Time 
diaries are a 24-hour record of respondent's activities; where the record is typically a 
description of activities undertaken, the time spent on these activities, including start time 
and end time in some cases, during specified time intervals. Whereas the Indian Time 
Use Survey 1998-99 uses 1-hour intervals, several European countries use 10-minute 
intervals in their time use survey (Mukherjee, forthcoming) 
 Nevertheless, time diaries by design are focused on activities in chronological 
order rather than on responsibilities, which can underestimate simultaneous activities 
including supervisory care. Supervisory care, i.e. being close to infants, young children 
and other dependents to provide hands-on care and nurturance when required, can be 
combined with work, or leisure and/or personal care time (including sleep). If someone 
has to be available to care for young infants 24 hours in a day, then the upper limit of 
supervisory care can be as high as 24 hours for young infants (Connelly and Kimmel 
2010). Unless time use diaries are explicitly designed to capture simultaneity, especially 
supervisory care with probing questions such as “what else did you do”, or  “were you 
responsible for a child in this period”, supervisory care tends to be underestimated in 
survey. Indeed, in a review of published results and survey methodologies of over 40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Latin American Surveys typically use activity logs where respondents are asked how much time they 
spent on a given activities in the previous week, and typically the list of activities contain 100 plus 
categories. 
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countries in another paper, I show that the time spent on childcare and other direct care is 
very low for all women except where diary instruments are designed to rigorously 
measure the simultaneity and/or responsibility for children. At the same time, time use 
diaries do capture hands-on care provided to children (Mukherjee, forthcoming). This is 
also true of the Indian Time Use Survey 1998-99 (see Technical Appendix, C5)  
Descriptive time use research 
 The broad gendered patterns of time use common to both developed and 
developing countries show that women spend more hours in care-giving than men in a 
given day or week; such gender differences are particularly pronounced when women and 
men are parents of young children. In a survey of 59 countries' time use data, Charmes 
finds that in most countries women's total hours of work (unpaid and paid work) are 
higher than that of men because women devote more time to the care of dependents and 
household chores on average compared to men (Charmes 2015). The disparities are the 
least with near parity in Northern and Western Europe, especially in Netherlands and the 
nordic countries (Charmes 2015, Burda, Hammemesh and Weil 2013). Trends of paid 
and unpaid work show that unpaid care work in particular is “sticky” with women 
remaining responsible for care work even as they are employed in greater numbers. For 
instance, cross-country trends for 20 countries spanning 1965 to 2003 show that married, 
employed fathers' time to unpaid work has increased from little less than 20 to 37 percent 
indicating women still do most of the unpaid work  (Hook 2006). Evidence from several 
other cross-country and individual country studies suggests that men's hours in unpaid 
care work has not increased as much as women's hours of paid work in most countries so 
that the gaps in total work hours persist (Burda, Hammemesh and Weil 2013, Budlender 
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2008, Charmes 2015, Aguiar and Hurst 2009, Giminez-Nadal and Sevilla 2014, 
Medeiros, Osorio and Costa 2007).  
 Descriptive research also illustrates the distinct nature of unpaid work in 
developing countries. Women in several developing countries have to compensate for the 
lack of public infrastructure and household amenities by spending pending substantial 
lengths of time on physically onerous tasks such as fetching water, firewood, and fodder 
in addition to cooking, cleaning and direct care of children (Blackden and Wodon 2006). 
Even the content of paid work tends to be diverse with both women and men relying on 
cultivation for the market, and wage work in both agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors (Budlender 2008, Hirway 2010).  
Time use data and hypotheses on intra-household allocation of time 
 Research that analyzes the causes of patterns and trends in women's work is still 
nascent.  Time-use research that examines hypotheses on the intra-household allocation 
of work hours is largely in the context of Australia, the US and European countries, and 
mostly on the gender differences between spouses. Several sociologists measure the 
impact of couples' relative earnings on time spent in unpaid household chores to test for 
bargaining and “doing gender” find evidence for both (Greenstein 1996, 2000, Newman 
2002, Bittman et al 2003, Schneider 2011, Baxter and Hewitt 2013, Bertrand, Kamenica 
and Pan 2015). As wives' contribution to household income goes from zero to half, they 
spend less time on household chores suggesting some bargaining effects at work. Yet, 
once women are the main breadwinners, they devote more time to household chores and 
their husbands who spend less time compared to other husbands. These results have been 
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interpreted as engaging in "gender display" or "neutralizing deviance" from the male-
breadwinner-female-dependent norm (Brines 1994, Greenstein 2000, Bittman et al 2003).   
 Another relevant factor (especially in affluent countries) is the potential for 
outsourcing household chores. Gupta (2007) and Gupta and Ash (2008) argue that 
absolute rather than relative earning matters because they affect women’s ability to 
purchase market substitutes for the services they might otherwise provide.  
 Cross-national differences illustrate the influence of distinct institutional 
environments on how women and men respond to shifts in relative earnings. For instance, 
while bargaining effects were evident in both Australian data from 1992 and U.S data 
from 1985 and 1987 i.e. women reduced time to housework as they earned more relative 
to their husbands, it is only the Australian data that showed an increase in women's 
housework once they earned more than their husband. Australian men seem impervious 
to changes in relative earnings, while U.S men decrease their housework slightly with 
lower relative earnings.  The male breadwinner norm appeared to be more predominant in 
Australia, so that couples with female breadwinners may be perceived as more "deviant" 
than in the US  (Bittman et al, 2003: 206-10, Baxter and Hewitt 2013: 47-48). 
 Women's time spent on childcare has been relatively more stable over the decades 
compared to time spent on household chores. For instance, during 1965 – 2005, time 
spent on childcare has remained relatively stable for all women in the US even after 
accounting for demographic changes (Aguiar and Hurst 2009, Bianchi 2000). However, 
time to household chores declined for both employed and non-employed mothers 
(Bianchi and Robinson 1997).  Parents may consider time devoted to children more of a 
luxury good: the income elasticity of time spent on child care is large and positive while 
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the income elasticity of time spent on home production is large and negative in the 
United States (Kimmel and Connelly 2007, Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney 2008). 
  In short, considerable evidence points to important interactions among social 
norms, conventional measures of bargaining power (market income, hours of paid work), 
and types of care work. At the same time, more attention has been given to married 
mothers and fathers and empirical research examining the role of co-resident women is 
relatively scarce. 	    Historical studies of the United States describe the important contributions that 
daughters made towards alleviating their mothers' workloads. In the early twentieth 
century, older daughters in immigrant working-class families tended to their younger 
siblings while their mothers did contracted piece work or other types of income-earning 
work (Nasaw 1985 in Bianchi 2000). The following decades witnessed increases in 
schooling and female labor force participation as well as declining co-residence of older 
children. Such trends were associated with a reduced supply of potential unpaid 
caregivers such as older daughters by the turn of the 21st century (Short, Goldscheider 
and Torr 2006). Indeed, data from the 1980s and 1990s shows that the reliance of 
mothers on relative care went down (Brewster and Padavic 2002, Abroms and 
Goldscheider 2002).  Older studies situated in developing countries also illustrate 
mothers' reliance on substitute caregivers, including daughters and grandmothers  (Ho 
1979, Chaudhury 1982, Engle 1989, Desai and Jain 1994, Tiefenthaler 1997).  	   	  Ethnographic work from India and other parts of South Asia suggest that older 
women can wield consider power over daughters-in-law, with implications for intra-
household allocation of time among women. Mothers-in-law can often dictate their 
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daughter's-in-law access to health care and nutrition, their reproductive choices and time 
spent on household work and unpaid work on family businesses (Kaur 2008, Pande and 
Ashton 2007, Simkhada, Porter and Teijlingen 2010). However, mothers-in-law typically 
wield power over their daughters-in-law as wives of the household head. When older 
women join the households of their sons i.e. are mothers of the household head , 
daughters-in-law have more room to exercise agency (Gallin 1994, Vera-Sanso 1999).  
Nevertheless, mothers-in-law are known to contribute to husbands abusing their wives 
(Fernandez 1997). In South Asia, the perceived under-performance of care work such as 
food not being prepared the right way is a commonly cited cause for violence (Rani and 
Bonu 2008). Such intra-gender relations among women strongly indicate that theories of 
intra-household allocation of time should consider the role of daughters and daughters-in-
law in women's strategies to reduce their unpaid work, especially unpaid care work.  
“Doing care” 
 
The insights of research on “doing gender” can be extended to a more specific 
analysis of “doing care”, which explains the interplay between social norms and relative 
bargaining power between women and men, as well as among women. By “doing care”, I 
refer to the obligations placed on women to provide care; obligations that are constructed 
both by the nature of care work and cultural norms. In this sense “doing care” is distinct 
from performing care work per se. Similarly, while hours of care work per se are central 
to outline my theory, it is different from “doing care.” 
 While my theory of "doing care" derives from “doing gender”, I highlight the 
urgency of meeting subsistence care needs. “Doing gender” implies that women perform 
expected gender roles via dress, affect, the performance of care work etc., to be 
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accountable as women (West and Zimmerman 1987). “Doing care” implies that women 
have to meet pressing subsistence needs of children and other dependents besides 
performing expected gender roles. “Doing care” also goes beyond “doing gender” by 
building on theories of institutional bargaining. Specifically, I propose a broader view of 
bargaining power with a focus on norms and practices, which assign care work to 
women, and make it difficult for women as a gender to resist such cultural obligations. 
 This theoretical perspective requires careful specification of the meaning of “care 
work”. Following other time use researchers and feminist economists, I use Reid's third 
party criterion to define work, and care as meeting the physiological needs of household 
members such as food, water, sanitation, shelter as well as emotional nurturance. I treat 
'care work', as a sub-category of work that corresponds with unpaid care given to family 
members. I attach the term "work" to "care" i.e. "care work" to convey that care is work 
insofar as the objective aspects of caring can be delegated to a third person; and that care-
giving can also involve physically demanding manual labor requiring significant time and 
efforts. Income earning work is all other work. That is, care work and income-earning 
work are mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of work (see Table C1, Technical 
appendix). Income earning can come under the rubric of care because one of the goals for 
earning an income is to provide care (Folbre and Yoon 2008). However, there is a 
distinction between income-earning work and care work because not all caring can be 
replaced by market purchased substitutes, and not all caring can be performed without 
any market purchased inputs. More, paid care work is a category I do not include in my 
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analysis as the reliance on paid child care and domestic chores tends to be negligible in 
rural India.4  
 Within care work, there is a distinction between direct care and indirect care. 
Direct care entails hands on physical care and emotional nurturance provided to other 
household members especially dependents. Typically, direct care is largely composed of 
childcare, especially supervisory care, as it is more common to have young children as 
dependents than the sick, elderly and the disabled. Indirect care is composed of those 
unpaid tasks that indirectly support physiological wellbeing such as cooking, cleaning, 
and fetching drinking water.  In rural areas, indirect care also includes SNA activities 
such as fetching drinking water, carrying loads of fuel wood and animal fodder, making 
"dung cakes" (fuel for earthen stoves), kitchen gardening, foraging for berries, fruits etc; 
tasks that are vital to preparing meals and supplementing meals.  	   The distinctions between income-earning and care work, and between indirect and 
childcare are also substantive with respect to intra-household allocation of time. Income-
earning work is associated with more fungibility and could offer bargaining power unlike 
care work. Within care work, the nature of both indirect and child care are such that they 
are not always compatible especially when women have to perform manual labor such as 
carrying heavy loads of firewood or fodder. Such incompatibility either necessitates the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The National Sample Survey on employment and unemployment reports share of workers by industrial 
codes, including those who work for households as “domestic personnel” which includes “housemaid”, 
“cook”, “gardener”, “gatekeeper/watchman”, “governess/babysitter” (i.e. nanny), “tutor”, “driver” and 
“others”. Together these formed about 0.8% of all rural Indian women employed, and 8.3% of all urban 
Indian women employed in 2011-12. (NSSO 2014: 166-69) Ostensibly it is for such reasons that the ITUS 
also does not include an explicit activity code for paid care work. Coding at the most disaggregated level 
has “petty services” which lumps together “domestic servants”, “sweepers”, “washers” with “barbers”, 
“cobblers”, “prostitution”, “guarding and watching for wages”.  
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need for substitute caregivers for young children and/or shapes incentives to delegate 
burdensome forms of care to other women in the household.  
 I propose a theory of bargaining power that accounts for a number of factors 
besides access to income that influence the intra-household allocation of time, especially 
to care work. I defined collective bargaining power as the ability of specific groups of 
people to influence norms, rules, practices, and the distribution of assets including those 
relevant to time spent on work.5 Collective bargaining power flows from collective 
identities (including gender) that demarcate women (or other genders) of different 
generations, marital status, relationship to family head, parental status class, caste, and so 
on (Folbre 1994). Women as a gender are culturally assigned to care work, which reduces 
their bargaining power. However, women from a given collective identity (class, caste, 
relationship to household head, parental and marital status, and so on) could reduce their 
care work hours depending on their access to assets, rules governing marriage, and norms 
specific to collective identities. 
 In the specific context of rural South Asia, norms, rules and practices create a 
social consensus that care work is women's work; a consensus that weakens women's 
collective bargaining power to persuade their husbands to assist them. Men are typically 
held responsible for subsistence requirements via agricultural work and other income 
earning activities that are not culturally viewed as care work.  Despite cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 My idea of collective bargaining power is distinct from Agarwal's extra-household bargaining power. 
Agarwal develops the concept of “extra-household bargaining power", which individual women have in 
their community and other spaces outside the household to explicitly challenge existing practices, 
distribution of endowments etc. that go against their interests. My idea of collective bargaining is more 
organic, diffuse, and referring to the decentralized ways in which specific kind of women find themselves 
constrained or empowered. In this sense, it has more to do with women's position as a gender intersected 
with other characteristics than it has to do with their explicit bargaining power as individuals or defined 
groups (such as being part of a women's association).  
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heterogeneity, all social groups, tend to view women as subordinate to their 
husbands/male relatives, particularly in their roles as wives and daughters-in-laws 
performing care work.  In most social groups, such subordination is reinforced by rules 
such as weak rights to property, to divorce and entitlements available on divorce; 
practices such as arranged marriage and early age of marriage; and cultural sanctions 
such as the threat of domestic violence and sexual violence for any deviations from 
expected femininity (Agarwal 1994, IIPS 2007, Jhejheebhoy et al 2013).6 The onus on 
women to “do care” is also reinforced by sanctions against parents of daughters as well as 
by older women who have a stake in the status quo. Parents arrange their daughters' 
marriages at an early age to avoid non-marital pregnancy that would entail social shame 
for the family.  
 Norms also construct identities by the intersection of gender and relationship to 
household head such as “wife”,  “son”, “daughter-in-law”, “daughter”; identities that are 
ordered in an hierarchy that empowers some women more than others in delegating care 
work.  Wives and daughters-in-laws rather than married and unmarried daughters of 
household heads are viewed as being responsible to provide care. Nevertheless, even 
among women who are married into the family, the more senior women delegate to junior 
women where seniority is based both on	   their relationship to the head and age of their 
husband (Agarwal 1997, Kaur 2008). Wives of households heads can delegate care work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 By the National Family Health Survey (NHFS), 2005-06 shows that 46% of all women aged 18-29 got 
married before the legal age of 18. Also, one in three women sampled report having been slapped by a 
husband and one in seven reported physical injuries as a result of spousal violence at some point. 54% of 
all women and 51% of all men sampled agreed that husbands are justified in beating a wife in some 
circumstances. Among women, 35% agreed that neglect of house and children merited being beaten by 
husband (IIPS 2007). In another study, women aged 15-24 whose marriages were arranged by families 
were more likely to experience violence than those who chose their own spouses or had semi-arranged 
marriages (Jhejheebhoy et al 2013) 
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to their daughters-in-law, and among daughters-in-law, those who are married to older 
sons have relatively more power and agency compared to those married to younger sons. 
Mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, or sisters-in-law married to brothers are thus often 
pitted against one another in the allocation of labor, property and other resources.  
Conflicts tend to favor older women who typically have stronger rights when they are 
married to the household head. 
 Given how norms and rules shape the collective bargaining power of people 
depending on their gender, marital status, age, and relationship to household head, the 
implications for intra-household allocation of time would be as given below. While time 
use data per se does not allows us to test alternative explanations based on a collective 
model, or norm-based model or income-based bargaining model, it does allow us to 
measure to the extent to which women can trade hours of care work with income-earning 
hours, as well as how their hours of work varies by the presence of other women in the 
family.    
 One, the trade-off between income-earning and care work for women will be 
limited. In turn, income-earning work would lengthen women's total work day. This is 
because women who earn incomes are not able to persuade their husbands to do more 
care work. 
 Two, older women who have daughters-in-law present in their household will be 
able to lower their care work. Women with daughters-in-law living with them are likely 
to to reduce their care work, and total work hours by delegating to their daughters-in-law 
in particular. Daughters-in-law are likely to be more important than daughters over 
women's' life cycle because sons continue the family line and it is their wives (i.e. 
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daughter-in-law) who remain in the households, rather than daughters who go to live in 
the households they are married into.  
 Third, mothers without co-resident daughters-in-law and other adult female 
relatives would rely on daughters more than sons.  That is, the presence of older 
daughters rather than older sons enable women to reduce their hours of care work, 
especially indirect care. 
  Finally, the nature and type of care work also matters for the extent to which it 
can delegated to other women in the household. Given the relative elasticity of indirect 
care compared to childcare, indirect care is more likely to be delegated to daughters-in-
law and daughters.  Indirect care such as cooking and fetching water, firewood and 
fodder are critical in the sense that they have to be done to ensure everyone including the 
caregiver has food and water. Yet, such tasks as well as others such as washing dishes and 
cleaning house are onerous and likely to be delegated to household members with less 
power such as daughters-in-law or young daughters.  When there are young children 
present in the household, it is more likely that tasks such as bathing, washing and 
supervisory care would be transferred from the mother to a substitute caregiver instead 
of, say breastfeeding infants.  
 The hypotheses outlined above are examined using the Indian Time Use Survey 
1998-99 as well as qualitative data gathered from Central India in the next two chapters.  
Econometric methods allow me to measure the extent to which women can reduce their 
total and care work hours via income-earning hours or delegation to other family 
members controlling for other factors. Vignettes and patterns from interviews conducted 
in Central India allows me to juxtapose the substitutability between women's care work 
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and income-earning hours against norms, beliefs and practices that shape care-giving, 
gender relations as well as relations among women. In this respect, the mixed method 
approach I deploy in my next chapter is useful to illustrate the role of norms and 
bargaining, especially because I cannot test whether substitutability is attributable to a 
collective model, or a divorce threat model or norm-based model or lack of collective 
bargaining. At the same time, the use of econometric methods allows me to confirm that 
substitutability is limited, and presence of daughters-in-law is what allows women reduce 
their time to care work. The third chapter uses econometric methods to examine which 
types of care work (direct child care, indirect care) mothers reduce when older children 
are present in addition to younger ones, and whether it is older daughters rather than older 
sons that make a difference to mothers without co-resident daughters-in-law. 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, I develop a theory of  “doing care” that combines insights from the 
literatures on institutional bargaining and “doing gender” to explain why women are 
more likely to rely on daughters-in-law and daughters than on husbands to reduce their 
care work, and hence their total work hours. Studies that test bargaining and “doing 
gender” hypotheses using American and Australian data find evidence for both. At the 
same time, dated village studies from developing countries as well as historical studies 
from the US illustrate the reliance of women on substitute care-givers especially 
daughters. While “doing gender” explains why women do more unpaid care work even 
when they are engaged in paid work in terms of cultural accountability, such 
accountability does not explain why women delegate care work to their daughters over 
sons, or to other female relatives. I build on theories of institutional bargaining to develop 
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a concept of collective bargaining power that outlines how norms and practices shape a 
social consensus of care as women's work, and make it difficult for women as a gender to 
resist the cultural obligations to provide care. More, even as all women are compelled to 
provide care, older women married to household heads can reduce time spent on hands-
on childcare and on indirect care by delegating to daughters-in-law and daughters.  
 While my arguments are similar to those made by Kandiyoti (1988) and Agarwal 
(1997) in problematizing the self-abnegation of women assumed by Sen (1990), I make 
two distinct contributions. First, I explain how bargaining power derived from norms and 
rules of care giving explain intra-household allocation of time in particular.  Second, I 
outline how norms and rules shape the collective bargaining power of women as a 
gender, which is not only weaker with respect to men (all else equal), but also under cut 
by intra-gender conflicts between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, as well as 
between sisters-in-law.  
 Having developed a theoretical perspective on “doing care” and then examined 
intra-household allocation of care work within households in the rest of my dissertation, I 
argue there is the scope to elaborate on “doing care” further with multi-level analysis. 
The influence of bargaining, norms and collective decisions could be discerned by 
linking a detailed institutional level analysis of prevailing laws, norms and rules in a 
given context (say Central India) with analysis of time use data and qualitative data on 
differences in preferences within households. Analysis of qualitative data such as the 
extent to which women's preferences are taken into account in household decisions; how 
norms influence different women's ability to resist care-giving, the types of care-giving 
they can resist and who they are likely to delegate care work to; and what the possibilities 
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for collective action on socializing care are could help to test “doing care” in terms of 
bargaining, norms, individual and collective decision-making. Such research, would help 
to outline in greater detail the ways in which the socialization of care has the potential to 
aid the empowerment of women as well as weaken one of the links in the chain that 
divide women from one another.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE WORK DAY IN RURAL INDIA  
 
Introduction 
Women typically work longer days than men  (UNDP 1995, World Bank 2012). 
Following Feminists Economists, I define work as any activity that can be potentially 
delegated to a third person.7 This definition of work encompasses paid and unpaid 
activities, and includes subsistence tasks, fetching water, cooking, and direct care of 
children and other dependents. Typically, men spend most of their workday on paid 
work, and women remain responsible for a bulk of unpaid work combining this with any 
paid work they do (Budlender 2010, Antonopolous and Hirway 2010, Razavi and Staab 
2012). In western, industrialized countries, one debate over such gender differences 
concerns the relative importance of bargaining power versus "doing gender". While paid 
work gives women economic independence to reduce unpaid work, they may still keep 
up unpaid work to remain accountably "feminine" (Brines 1994, Bittman, England, et al 
2003).  In South Asia, however, the terms of this debate differ in important respects -- 
divorce is uncommon limiting the threat of exit, and fulfilling care responsibilities is not 
just a normative or performative act of “doing gender” but also a subsistence 
requirement. Poor women face particularly intense pressure to prioritize family needs 
while earning incomes (Akintola 2008, Blackden and Wodon 2006, Floro and 
Pichetpogsa 2010).  While increased availability of time use data has deepened the scope 
to examine possible household bargaining effects of paid work, such research is relatively 
sparse in developing country contexts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Margaret Reid first suggested this definition in the Economics of Household Production (1934). 
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 In this paper, I explain why rural Indian women work longer hours than men. 
Given the strong cultural obligations on married women to perform unpaid care, and the 
pressing need to fetch water and cook food, there is limited substitutability between such 
tasks and earning incomes in a low-wage economy. As a result increases in women's paid 
hours do not reduce unpaid care hours by much and results in a net increase in their total 
work hours. Although husbands face pressures to meet household needs via agricultural 
and wage work, these are not viewed as care and they are not culturally obliged to 
perform care work. Like some studies that test “doing gender” and bargaining power, 
mine suggests that husbands "do gender" by not helping with care. However, controlling	  
for other factors, I also show that wives' total work hours are increased by their paid 
hours, reduced when a daughter-in-law lives with them and that both the responsiveness 
of care work to children and hours of paid work varies with cultural norms shaped by 
group membership. 
 In what follows, I outline how care work constitutes distinct tasks in rural, 
developing country contexts, and offer a critique of conventional bargaining models that 
have limited inapplicability to the South Asian context. My theory of "doing care" is 
informed both by theories of institutional bargaining and by qualitative interviews 
gathered in rural Central India. I document the nature of care work; normative differences 
between Adivasis (a low income social group with less restrictive gender norms) and 
other social groups; and also the limited substitution that occurs between paid and care 
work. Econometric analysis of data on married couples from the Indian Time Use Survey 
(1998-99), including a disaggregation of results by social groups confirms that “doing 
care” leads to limited substitutability between paid and care work.  Every additional hour 
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of paid work in a day reduces wives' care work by 0.56 and leaves them working 0.44 
hour more in total. Little compensating increase in husbands' care work hours takes place 
in response to their wives' additional hours of paid work. Indeed, husbands provide little 
care work to begin with. An increase in the number of children (aged 5 years or less) per 
adult in the household also increases wives' total work hours per day by 0.74. Controlling 
for other aspects of household composition, married women whose daughters-in-law live 
with them perform 1.46 fewer hours per day compared to others. Finally, cultural norms 
are sufficiently heterogeneous that Adivasi wives hours of care work increase only by 
0.50 for every unit increase in ratio of own-children to adults compared to 0.83 for Dalit 
wives; also Adivasi wives reduce care work hours by 0.66 for every income earning hour, 
and Dalit wives by 0.54. These econometric results suggest that Adivasi wives engage in 
less time-intensive parenting strategies, which is consistent with my qualitative findings 
that they do not face the same pressures to provide intensive child care as non-Adivasi 
wives. 
Work, Bargaining and Gender 
While care work has been defined in several ways, I define it here as unpaid 
activities that directly meet the physical needs and emotional nurturance of family 
members, especially for children.8 Income-earning work takes the form of agricultural 
activities for subsistence or sale, and manufacturing and services for sale. While income-
earning work indirectly meets basic needs by enabling consumption of goods and 
services purchased, it is distinct because those who perform it have more direct control 
over the product of their labor. Care work differs from income-earning work as it cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 My first chapter provides a more detailed review of these definitions.  
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always be purchased, and is governed by particularly strong gender norms. My 
definitions of care work and income-earning work represent two mutually exclusive 
categories that together constitute total work.9 
 Studies from Asian, African and Latin American countries illustrate how care and 
income-earning work involve longer hours in developing countries especially for poor 
women (Blackden and Wodon 2006, Akintola 2008, Budlender 2010; Antanapolous and 
Hirway 2010,  Razavi and Staab 2012). In rural areas, while both men and women rely on 
multiple activities to make ends meet, men primarily do income-earning work and 
women tend to combine unpaid care, unpaid work on family operated farms and 
agricultural wage work (Budlender 2010, Hirway 2010). Care work in rural areas 
typically involves onerous work such as carrying heavy loads of water, firewood and 
fodder necessary for meal preparation and family care (Mukherjee 2009, Hirway 2010).  
Rural women spend substantial lengths of time on unpaid care in areas lacking public 
infrastructure for provision of water, electricity, childcare and health care, and access to 
consumer durables such as washing machines  (Mukherjee 2009, Akintola 2008). Even 
urban women in developing countries tend to combine paid work, and unpaid care work 
in ways that both lengthen work hours and increase work intensity (Floro and 
Pitchetpongsa 2010). Yet research on why women work longer hours than men in 
developing countries is sparse. 
 Efficiency concerns help explain time allocation. For instance, assuming women 
are more productive in unpaid care and men in paid employment (i.e. “intrinsically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 By my definition, paid care work would comes under income-earning work. The Indian Time Use survey 
lumps paid care (“domestic services”) with petty services so its not possible to parse out number of hours 
worked or even proportion of women who report hours of paid care work. Most recent data available from 
the National Sample Surveys on Employment and Unemployment shows that approximately 0.8% of all 
women in rural India are engaged in paid domestic work (see first dissertation essay for more). 
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different comparative advantages"), Becker proves that the household's basket of goods 
and services is maximized when women specialize in home production and men in 
market production (Becker 1965, Becker 1985: S41).   In principle, a rise in women’s 
wages, all else equal, should lead to a reduction in their time devoted to home production. 
Similarly, access to drinking water, gas stoves or electricity improves productivity in 
unpaid care creating either an 'income effect' where time spent on unpaid care is reduced 
releasing time for paid employment, or a 'price effect' where time on more productive 
care such as elaborate meals and hands-on-activities with children is increased 
(Dinkelman 2011, Ilhai and Grimard 1999). However, the net effect on women's total 
hours worked relative to men's remains unclear. 
 Gender differences in total hours worked have typically been explained either by 
differences in bargaining power or by gender norms.  In particular, the divorce threat 
model predicts that the spouse who has lower earnings, or fewer options outside marriage 
will perform more unpaid household labor in exchange for material support because 
he/she has more to lose from divorce (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 
1981). Another bargaining approach suggests that independent access to market income 
allows women to purchase substitutes for their income (Gupta 2007). These models are 
not particularly appropriate for South Asia where divorce rates are extremely low, and 
households are quite poor.  
 In bargaining models that emphasize economic independence alone, neither sex 
nor gender plays an explicit role. However, gender identity complicates negotiations over 
household division of labor (Sen 1990). Actions perceived as deviations from one's 
identity cause enough unease to change perceptions of gains and losses and the way 
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bargaining power is exercised (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Women who earn as much or 
more than their husbands may still work longer hours on household chores than their 
husbands because it aligns with their gender identity (Bittman et al 2003). The theory of 
"doing gender" explains such compliance: When couples do not fit typical breadwinner-
dependent norms, women draw upon other types of 'sex categorization' including 
performance of household chores to present competency as women (West and 
Zimmerman 1987).10 West and Zimmerman emphasize the impact of broader normative 
pressures on individual identity and agency that go beyond Akerlof and Kranton's 
account.  
  Other sociologists also challenge narrow models of bargaining with evidence on 
the role of gender norms: earnings reduce women's time spent on domestic chores as long 
as they earn less than their husbands, otherwise, couples do “gender” such that women 
increase time on domestic chores (Brines 1994, Bittman, England et al 2003, Yu and Xie 
2011, Baxter and Hewitt 2013, Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan 2015).  The salience of 
gender norms for care work is evident in western, industrialized nations where gender 
gaps in total work have persisted, or even increased in Catholic countries such as Italy 
and Spain (Burda, Hammermesh and Weil 2013, Giminez-Nadal and Sevilla 2014). 
Women's time to unpaid childcare seems invariant with paid work in some developing 
countries (Budlender 2008, Newman 2002). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 By "doing gender", West and Zimmerman present an argument where gender is the product of "social 
doings" and not just a set of traits, and roles (1987:129). Rather than having to live up to normative 
conceptions of femininity or masculinity, gender is an ongoing activity in everyday interactions, where 
individuals are accountable to others in their interactions and beyond for presenting as female/feminine and 
male/masculine. Thus, an individual who is biologically female could engage in unfeminine behavior such 
as not doing housework but is still accountable in their social context for being unfeminine etc. 
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Feminist economists have called attention to the impact of social institutions on 
household level bargaining.  For instance, laws that limit wives' control over marital 
property or protection from domestic violence, and norms that encourage submission to 
male authority, put women in a weak position to negotiate with their husbands (Folbre 
1994, Agarwal 1997, Braunstein and Folbre 2001, Kabeer 2002). Indeed, rules and norms 
themselves can be bargained over (Agarwal 1997). An institutional approach to 
bargaining is consistent with West and Zimmerman's theory of "doing gender".11 If 
gender is an accomplishment from everyday practices and interactions, then everyone is 
constantly "doing", and "redoing gender" (West and Zimmerman 1987, 2009). However, 
everyone also weighs pros and cons, including material costs, figuring out effective ways 
to meet their individual and collective goals (Folbre 1994). For instance, Lundberg and 
Pollak's (1993) separate spheres model treats social norms as the fallback such that 
women and men retreat to their traditional gender roles (instead of separating) when 
bargaining fails. Perhaps men resist care-giving responsibilities given the risk of penalties 
such as reduced leisure and lifetime earnings for providing care (Badgett and Folbre 
1999). Such penalties also make it difficult for women to exit marriage, and may explain 
why separate sphere norms are sticky. 
 In sum, the persistence of gender norms and implications for women's agency 
over hours of work is under-theorized. I build on the complementarity between 
institutional bargaining and “doing gender” to explain why rural women work longer 
hours than rural men. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Institutional bargaining is also consistent with Akerlof and Kranton. However Folbre and Agarwals 
approaches have fuller explanations on how pay-off structures can shift with sufficient collective agency 
i.e. there can be a dialectic between “gender identity” and individual actions.  
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"Doing Care" and Gender differences in the Work Day 
By “doing care,” I refer to the social pressures and urgency to provide care, and 
that women's ability to resist such pressures is limited by cultural norms, rules and 
practices. An examination of how “doing care” limits the bargaining power derived from 
income-earning work requires some attention to the conceptual distinctions between care 
work and income-earning work.  
  As outlined above, care work directly meet basic needs of family members, 
especially children, and income-earning work is all other work, including subsistence 
agriculture.12 Caregivers cannot make credible threats to neglect dependents. This is a 
different material position than paid employees, even unpaid family members, who often 
have the capacity to shirk on the job or strike for changes in the terms and processes of 
work. Care work also tends to be invisible, unrecognized, and devalued while income-
earning work provides fungible resources, and is valued monetarily and socially. Those 
who spend more hours in caregiving thus have weaker bargaining power compared to 
those who perform more hours of income-earning work. 
 My perspective of  “doing care” emphasizes bargaining power that flows from 
norms and practices on care-giving and the urgency of meeting subsistence needs besides 
having access and control over earnings. Such an emphasis generates several implications 
for the allocation of labor time between husbands and wives. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 While subsistence agriculture could come under care, in India produce grown on the same plot is 
typically divided into portions for directly meeting subsistence and also for sale. Since labor inputs are 
indivisible and produce is partly for sale, I treat all unpaid and paid agricultural activities as income earning 
work. Unpaid agricultural activities also tend to be relatively more visible and fungible compared to unpaid 
care. I elaborate this in greater detail in my first dissertation essay, also how my separation between care 
and income-earning work corresponds in some respects to that between work within the boundaries of the 
System of National Accounts i.e. SNA work and non-SNA work.   
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 First, women's ability to reduce hours of care work is limited, as family needs 
such as water and food cannot be postponed.13 When it comes to providing indirect care, 
women could resist in covert ways such as over-spicing the curry or burning the 
chapattis. Nevertheless, these threats are limited as women also eat the food they prepare.  
 Second, women's ability to substitute care work hours with income-earning work 
hours is constrained by low earnings and limited control over earnings.  Care work 
cannot be completely purchased, and yet it cannot be performed without any market 
purchased inputs either. Poor women in particular have strong incentives to do 
agricultural and/or income earning work in addition to care work to meet their families 
needs. Such pressures are greater if men do not do agricultural work for some reason. 
However, the limited options of manual wage work available to women in rural India are 
such that the meager wages may be insufficient to generate surpluses required to make 
care-burden reducing investments, or to persuade husbands to do more care work. Thus, 
even when women have control over incomes earned, these could be insufficient to 
reduce their work hours.14  
 Third, gender norms pit woman against one another in the division of care work. 
The easiest way for women to reduce their care work burden is to make other women do 
part of it. Older women who are married to household heads, and who have daughters-in-
law living with them can delegate care work to them in their capacity as wives' of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Although some forms of care work can be postponed relatively more than others as I argue in my third 
dissertation essay, where I examine whether “doing care” entails reducing time to direct child care to carve 
out time for fetching water, firewood, fodder, forest produce and cooking. 
14 Agarwal (1997) cites several studies on how South Asian women engage in covert forms of resistance to 
their families -- such as by secretly earning cash by taking small income earning jobs or selling portions of 
the household grain, where such acts of resistance are to earn incomes not only for subsistence but also to 
build "social capital" through gift giving to natal kin networks or other personal needs (1997). Yet even in 
such instances, surpluses may not be enough to buy the requisite infrastructure.	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household head.15 Older women thus have incentives to arrange for their son's marriage at 
an early age, which in turn promotes early marriages for women. 
 Finally, both gender norms and poverty interact to influence time allocation. For 
instance, Adivasis, or scheduled tribes from the central belt in India, are culturally 
distinct from all other scheduled tribes and all other groups with implications for intra-
household bargaining power.  Adivasis constitute the poorest in India, located in hilly or 
forested enclaves with cultural practices distinct from those of caste Hindus  (Alkire and 
Santos 2010, Shah et al 1998, Guha 2007).  In particular, Adivasis place relatively fewer 
restrictions on women compared to other groups (Guha 2007, Ghurye 1963). Thus, while 
women from all social groups are assigned to “doing care”, Adivasi women may have 
slightly different behavioral responses to paid work.  
 Overall, the concept of "doing care" is more relevant to gender differences in 
work hours in rural India than the concept of “doing gender" applied in developed 
countries.  
Qualitative methods and findings 
  My emphasis on “doing care” emerges from qualitative field research, which 
included semi-structured interviews and participant observation notes.  
I lived in and gathered data from BN and SN; villages located in the Nimad valley 
of Bagli, a sub-district of the state Madhya Pradesh in India (coded to maintain privacy). 
My interviews were all conducted in 4 weeks between mid-August and mid-December 
2011, a period covering part of the rainy and winter seasons respectively. BN was 
populated by ~300 households, almost wholly Adivasi with less than 10% being Sirvi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  If older women start living with their son and wife, daughters-in-law may have greater power.  
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households (middle caste), Dalit (scheduled caste) and/or Muslim. SN was populated by 
~150 households with roughly half being Adivasi and the other half being Sirvi. I used 
purposive sampling to choose 55 households, and interviewed 135 respondents (aged 13 
and above) (see Appendix A1). While I branched into deeper details if respondents 
offered additional insights and/or were open to having longer conversation, themes I 
covered in all my interviews included: (a) descriptions of the previous day from time of 
waking to falling asleep, in chronological sequence of activities performed, estimates of 
time spent and whether these overlapped with being responsible for children, (b) whether 
respondents saw themselves as being time constrained and their ideas on alleviating such 
constraints, and (c) farm production and expenses incurred. I located recurring patterns of 
time use, and of perceptions of roles and responsibilities in my interviews and 
observations. 
  Women's workdays were longer than men's with more diverse tasks and more 
simultaneous tasks largely due to responsibility for care work. Among Adivasis, both 
women and men performed hard, manual labor, but it was women who combined care 
work with other work without much time to rest. Whereas women's work days were as 
long as 16 hours in several cases, men's were at the most 12 hours. Across all Adivasi 
time diaries, a woman's typical day started before the crack of dawn, continuing well past 
sun-down, and the demand for women's labor was constant throughout the day and the 
season: their tasks --- child care, cleaning out the hearth, cooking, fetching water, 
gathering and carrying bundles of firewood or fodder, cleaning out animal pens, mud-
washing floors and walls of mud homes, or weeding in between rows of planted crops – 
were unrelenting. Postponement of some tasks could lead to adverse consequences. As B 
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(Adivasi, female, aged 59) remarked to me, "People have to eat, cattle have to be fed."  In 
contrast, men's workdays were largely composed of agricultural and/or income-earning 
work alone, with ample time for leisure. The demand for men's labor peaked at specific 
points of the rainy season: sowing (early-mid July), tilling for a few days 3-4 times 
(August - October) and harvesting around mid-November.  
 Among the middle-caste Sirvis, the gender difference in hours worked were lower 
than Adivasis due to lower hours and diversity of tasks for Sirvi women compared to 
Adivasi women. Sirvi women typically had gas stoves and drinking water in their homes, 
and their work days were largely composed of care work such as preparing elaborate 
meals, making endless cups of teas for male relatives and visitors, and supervising 
children's homework, bathing and feeding. Sirvi men supervised workers, watered crops 
in the non-rainy seasons, and guarded mature crops overnight. Both Sirvi men and 
women worked a maximum of 13 hours, and men in particular had more time for social 
interactions. 
 On being asked how they managed to balance care work and income-earning 
work, several women explained that certain types of care work were a priority. Women 
with young children had to either wake up between 3.30-4:00 AM instead of 5:00-6:00 
AM to fit in tasks such as cooking food; or leave for other work one to two hours later 
than other women. While Sirvi women from wealthier households did not have to add 
income-earning work to care work, those with younger children woke-up earlier to fit in 
their kitchen responsibilities. Adivasi women cited postponing agricultural work as well 
as waking up earlier as a strategy to do care work. Yet, at times the urgency of weeding 
or harvesting was such that women would forego not only personal care such as bathing, 
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but also some care work such as washing clothes or sweeping, and direct care such as 
ensuring children's meals. As R (Adivasi, female, 36) said, “I cook and leave food. Who 
has the time to feed children? Sometimes they are good and eat; sometimes dogs get to 
uneaten food.” But even this mother, pressed for time, did not neglect the task of cooking 
and leaving food. 
 There were implicit conflicts between women and men in their perception of how 
women's work burden could be alleviated. Women without resources in their households, 
mostly Adivasi, had substantive ideas for reducing work hours: gas stoves, regular water 
supply, concrete/non-mud homes, and toilet facilities within their homes. Some explained 
this would release more time for work on their fields or for wage work. In contrast, men 
had not thought about these options. Both Sirvi and Adivasi men explained women's long 
workdays as a result of their marital obligations. Some men could not comprehend why I 
asked them about alleviating women's work burdens. Others, who acknowledged the 
utility of reducing women's time constraints, did not describe laborsaving home 
investments as an urgent need. 
 Older women perceived daughters-in-law as means to alleviating their own work 
burdens, their interviews replete with references to daughter-in-laws. B (Adivasi, female, 
59): "Before [my] daughters-in-law came to us, it would take me all the way until 11.00 
am to get all the work at home done. Now my troubles are smaller. I can go to my field 
on time ever since I have daughters-in-law." In contrast, H (Adivasi, female, 49): "I have 
to work by myself; no daughter-in-law so I am more pressured", and K (Sirvi, female, 
55), “When my daughter-in-law was away, I was frantic for time.”  
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 Some daughters-in-law face the threat of violence. Among Sirvis in SN, 
“Daughters-in-laws are treated worse than animals... servants get more respect in some 
homes of this village” according to N (Sirvi, female, 37). A respondent from another 
household agreed with this (Sirvi, female, 24). Among Adivasis in BN, anecdotes suggest 
violence is accepted. During my stay in BN, an 18-year-old young woman, who was held 
responsible by her mother-in-law to take care of all six sisters-in-law aged 3 to 12, spoke 
sternly to one of them for refusing to help her with a domestic chore. She was beaten by 
her husband for doing so. While some respondents expressed sympathy for this woman, 
their disapproval for the husband focused on the public nature of his actions -  “He 
shouldn't have hit her so much on the front yard for everyone to see.”  
 Adivasis and Sirvis differed in the distinct roles that wives and daughters-in-law 
were assigned and also in views of marital separation. Whereas Adivasi married women 
were frequently referred to as the “ [female] one who worked”, Sirvi married women 
were viewed as the “[female] one who stayed home”. Adivasis wives were involved in 
agricultural production decisions, and had information on expenses incurred even if it 
was their husbands who made the purchases. Their husbands frankly admitted to being 
capable of doing care work, but chose not to, explicitly citing marriage as a means to get 
work done. Consider this conversation between X, Y and Z, young married men aged 22, 
25 and 27 respectively:  
X [To me]: I used to cut vegetables, cook roti's, wash my clothes and do 
everything myself. But these two would come over and pester me saying, 
"Get married, get married, you won't have to do any of this". My parents 
got swayed by their words and looked for a match for me. 
Y: Good came of it, no? Now you don't have to wash your clothes or cook. 
[To me]: He is the only one left to take care of his old parents. His 
mother's eyesight was failing so he had to take care of the field, work for 
the organization and also do all the kitchen work.  
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Me: So all of you know how to cook and do these things?  
Y: Yes, I can cook. Very well. I cooked and washed clothes when I was in 
college in Indore.  I had to. But once I got married two years ago, I didn't 
have to anymore. 
Marriage was clearly viewed by Adivasi men as a means to get care work done. Married 
Adivasi men in the Nimad region routinely performed care work when women were on 
their menstrual cycle, as it was considered 'inauspicious' for women to enter the kitchen 
during that time. At other times, there were clear social sanctions against men doing care 
work. As R (male, 38) remarked, "Any man who did women's work would be jeered as a 
'wife's slave'". Another interviewee, K (female, 20) couldn't ask her 19-year-old brother-
in-law to help her because, "He is not so young that I can tell him what to do".  
 In contrast to Adivasi wives, Sirvi wives tended not to have information on 
production decisions and expenses, and told me to ask their husbands about “those 
matters.” This was true also of the few poorer Sirvi women who did hands-on work in the 
field when the means to hire wageworkers was limited. On being asked why women did 
care work or income-earning work, the wealthiest Sirvi patriarch in SN described women 
as being naturally ordained to be mothers, and women who had to work on the fields as 
the outcome of poverty. Yet, he also explained tasks such as weeding, and sowing as 
women's tasks given their patience, focus and “careful hands.” 
 The contrast between Adivasi's view of married women as workers, and Sirvis' 
view of women's roles as caregivers, corresponded with differences in rules of separation 
between these groups. Among Adivasis the groom gives the bride's parents household 
goods and/or cash [“bride-price”] as recognition of receiving someone who works. 
Separation was uncommon; yet there were clear rules that a woman could initiate 
separation to marry another man as long as her ex-husband was repaid the original bride 
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price plus interest as decided by the elders' council. Among Sirvis the brides' parents give 
money, jewelry and other assets to the groom and his family [“dowry”] as recognition of 
transferring responsibility of the woman to the groom's family. Some even framed dowry 
as a way of giving young men fixed capital to start their new role as a family provider.  
Separation was viewed unfavorably, there were no rules for repaying dowry and the 
concerned woman's reputation was perceived as being tarnished. Such differences in 
options to separate and perceptions of married women's role may have implications for 
bargaining power over work hours, which I investigate using econometric analysis.  
Quantitative methods and findings 
  Data from the pilot Indian Time Use Survey (ITUS) of 1998-99 provide an 
opportunity to compare Adivasis and other groups by testing hypotheses on gender 
differences in work time. The ITUS is the only publicly available survey of it kind 
covering multiple regions in India: Tamilnadu (South), Madhya Pradesh (Central), 
Gujarat (West), Orissa (East), Meghalaya (North East) and Haryana (North west).16 
Conducted largely between July 1998 and June 1999, the survey collected data over the 
entire year to capture seasonal changes. I restrict my analysis to rural areas, which 
represent 70% of all households covered.17 I also limit my analysis to married couples 
comprised of household heads and their spouses to compare married men and women in 
circumstances as similar to each other as possible. For each couple, I determine a ratio of 
the number of their children to all adults in their household and whether they had one or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) that administers this survey has repeatedly said it 
will administer another national survey since 2012 and the survey has not happened yet. The National 
Statistical Commission of India, which oversees the NSSO and other statistical organizations, have also not 
listed a national time use survey as a priority.  
17 The reason I choose rural India is because it presents a distinctly, agrarian context with greater diversity 
in daily activities and because Adivasis are a minority who tend to be concentrated in rural areas.	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more daughters-in-law living with them. My analysis also includes a comparison of 
Adivasis and Dalits, groups located at the bottom of the income distribution in India but 
with some differences in gender norms, because this allows me to test if Adivasi 
behavioral responses in terms of work hours are significantly different from to those of 
Dalits.18 While the ITUS has limited wealth variables (like many other datasets), the 
comparison between two low income/marginalized social groups with different gender 
norms reveal how cultural differences can vary the degree of substitutability between care 
work and income-earning work hours.  
 I estimate the following equation for married couples in four models where Yj 
represents care work hours of wives, total work hours of wives, care work hours of 
husbands and total work hours of husbands: 
Yj = α  + Σ βkDkj + ΓiXij + ΓβXβj + Γγ Xγj + uβj + ej 
The key independent variables are as follows: 
D1j: Own income-earning work hours, 
D2j:  Spouses income-earning work hours, 
D3j: Household child-dependent ratios (ratio of couples' children aged 0-5 to all adults 
aged 15-75) 
D4j: At least one daughter-in-law lives in the household, or not 
D5j: Social group (Adivasi, Dalit or Others i.e. all non-Adivasi-non-Dalit persons) 
The control variables are as follows: 
Xij: Individual controls – own age, age squared, and educational level achieved  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The ITUS distinguishes between Adivasis (scheduled tribes), Dalits (scheduled castes) and Other 
(everyone else). It was not possible to separate middle caste groups (such as Sirvis) from upper caste 
groups in the category “Others”.  
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Xβj: Household controls – education of household head, land possessed, quality of 
housing  
Xγj: Controls for season, type of day19 and geography (state fixed effects) 
I test the following hypotheses for all married couples: 
1. The coefficient on own income-earning hours (D1j) is positive for wives' total 
work hours. As a corollary, the coefficient of spouses' income-earning hours (D2j) 
is nil and insignificant for husbands' total work hours i.e. wives' income-earning 
hours have no influence on their husbands' care work hours.  
2.  The coefficient of household child dependent ratios (D3j) is positive for hours of 
wives' care work, and total work, and is positive but significantly smaller for 
husbands' care and total work hours, both of which illustrate “doing care” as 
wives' obligations and not husbands.  
3. The coefficient of having at least one daughter-in-law (D4j) co-residing in the 
household is negative for wives' care work and total work hours. This coefficient 
is almost nil for their husbands.  
4. The coefficient for Dalits and for Others (D5j) is negative i.e. they have lower 
hours of care and total work than Adivasi's with larger differences among wives 
than husbands. 
Finally, disaggregating the equation above by social group, I also predict: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Typically there are three seasons: Kharif (July-Oct); Rabi (Nov-Feb) and summer (Mar-June), but the 
survey was conducted 1998-99 with a bulk of days between July '98 to June '99.  Respondents report on  
"previous week" in the dataset. Each of these "previous weeks" are feasible combinations of three different 
types of diary days --- ("normal", "weekly variant", "abnormal") --- in the five following categories: (i) all 7 
are normal days- (7,0,0); (ii) all are normal and weekly variant days only  - (6,1,0)  (5,2,0); (iii) all are 
normal and abnormal days only - (6,0,1) (5,0,2);  (iv) all three types of days -  (0,1,6), (5,1,1) (4,1,2) (4,2,1) 
(3,2,2), and (v) all 7 are weekly variant days- (0,7,0) or  all 7 are abnormal days- (0,0,7). The definitions of 
these days as well as the need to control for them are given in the description of the dataset below. 
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5. The slope coefficients for Adivasi wives (D1j – D4j) are significantly smaller than 
those of Dalits and Other wives. That is, at the margin Adivasi wives are able to 
make slightly higher trade-offs between income-earning work and care work, are 
less responsive to child dependent ratios, and rely less on daughters-in-law 
compared to both Dalits and Others. 
An important caveat here is the issue of simultaneity – just as income-earning hours 
may be used to lower hours of care work, the obligations on women to do care work 
when they have young children places limits to the hours of wage work they can perform 
especially when such work is located far away from their homes. This endogeneity in 
income-earning hours for women in particular is such that the estimated coefficient of 
income-earning hours is more negative (further from 0) than the true value (closer to 0). 
This bias makes the coefficient higher than the true extent to which women and men 
reduce their total and care work hours for every income-earning hours. There are no 
suitable instrumental variables that can be used from the dataset to correct for this bias. 
However, even with the bias, the coefficient is still negative and predicts substitutability 
that is greater than the true value. In this sense, the model does not reject my claims and 
can be interpreted as measuring an upper limit to substitutability instead of the “effect” of 
income-earning work on care and total work respectively.  
 A descriptive overview of difference in hours of work between husbands and 
wives shows that wives work 1.5 hours longer than husbands per day (Table 1). As 
expected wives' longer workday than husbands' is correlated with almost exclusive 
responsibility for care work and performance of income-earning work on top of care 
work. Wives do almost all care work, with a difference of 6 hours on average per day 
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between wives and husbands. Yet wives also spend a third of their workday on income-
earning activities unlike husbands who spend almost all of their work day (more than 
90%) on such activities.  As my qualitative findings suggest, married women have a more 
diverse workday than their husbands.  
 The LOWESS (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing) plot of care work and 
total work hours against the ratio of couples children to all adults in the household shows 
that child-dependent ratios increase work hours for both wives and husbands (Figure, 
Plots 1.1 and 1.2).20  However, higher child-dependent ratios increase total work hours 
for women and their husbands through different channels; due to care work for women 
and income-earning work for their husbands. Wives with child dependent ratios of 1.5 
have one hour more of care work compared to those with ratios of 0.5. Hours of all work 
for women are also higher by an hour in the same range of child-dependent ratios (see red 
lines).  Husbands' hours of care work are at much lower levels, and do not change much 
between child- dependent ratios of 0.5 and 1.5 even though their total hours of work are 
far higher and increase by an hour (see blue lines). 
 Married women's care work and total work hours also vary by the presence of a 
daughter-in-law and social group (Table 2).   Wives who have at least one daughter-in-
law living with them perform 1.9 hours less work in total and 2.5 hours less care work 
compared to others. Husbands with at least one daughter-in-law living with them do an 
hour less of total work but this is due to 0.8 hours less of income-earning work (Panel 1, 
row 3). Raw social group differences indicate that Adivasis work the longest hours (both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Conceptually akin to moving averages, this smoothing is achieved by joining the predicted means of 
work time from successive regressions on household child dependent ratios  (typically) on given ranges of 
the sample at a time. The advantage of the lowess is that it does not impose a single linear or non-linear 
regression line, but reveals the underlying relationship between the two variables concerned through 
hundreds of separate regressions lines joint together. 
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wives and husbands, row 4) and the differences between Adivasis and Dalits are larger 
than those between Dalits and Others (rows 7, 8). Care work hours do not vary much 
among wives, so that the difference in total hours is largely due to differences in income-
earning hours. However, social group differences reflect wealth differences as well as 
cultural differences. Likewise, the presence of a daughter-in-law associated with lower 
work hours for wives may be capturing other demographic factors such as age and 
presence of young children. Multivariate regression results, presented later, clarify these 
issues. 
 The LOWESS plot of care and total work against income-earning work shows 
that care work hours are negatively correlated to income-earning hours, but not enough 
for a negative correlation with total work hours as well (Figure 3, Plots 2.1 and 2.2). 
Income-earning hours are positively correlated to all work hours. This is particularly true 
for wives (red lines). Comparing wives with 5 hours of income-earning work to those 
with 10 hours, the difference in average hours of care work is 3. The trade-off between 
income-earning hours and care work hours is not one-to-one; and the slope of total work 
hours is less than one (red line, Plot 2.1) Indeed, bivariate regression coefficients show 
that for a one hour increase in income-earning work is associated with 0.56 hour decline 
in wives care work and 0.44 hour increase in all work (Table 3).  Given the bias, the true 
coefficient would measure a decline in care work that is even lower, and an increase in 
total work that is higher. 
 Husbands have very low average hours of care work and much of the decline in 
care work hours is for those who do less than 5 hours of income-earning work (blue line, 
Plot 2.2). Since the bulk of husbands' work is income-earning work, husbands’ average 
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hours of all work plotted for income-earning hours approach the 45-degree line 
(green/solid line, Plot 2.1). A one-hour increase in husbands' income-earning work 
reduces care work by 0.14 and increases total work by 0.86 (Table 3). 
 Multivariate regressions show that the bivariate effects remain strong even after 
inclusion of a rich set of controls. In Table 4, columns 1-4 compares the effects of 
independent variables on married women's care work and total work hours, with and 
without controls respectively. Columns 5-8 give the effects for their husbands' care work 
and total work hours, with and without controls.  These results suggest the relations 
between income-earning hour and care work hours are less likely to reflect selectivity of 
women with paid work.  
 For wives, a one hour increase in income-earning hours is associated with a 
decline in care work hours by 0.58 hours, and an addition of 0.42 hours to the length of 
the total work day (row 1, column 3-4); nearly identical to the bivariate results.  A one-
hour increase in wives' income-earning hours is associated with a 1 percent increase of 
their spouses' care work hours (row 2, column 6-7).  While this could be interpreted as 
some increase in wives bargaining power relative to husbands, the 42 percent increase in 
wives total work hours confirms that income-earning work lengthens women's workday 
and does not change their spouse's work hours. Again, the bias means that the true 
increase in wives' total work hours should be higher.  
 The positive effect of household child-dependent ratios on married women's hours 
of work is three times higher than the effect on their husband's hours.21 A unit increase of 
the dependent ratio leads to a 0.75 hour increase in women's care and total work, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The difference in coefficients is significant using post-estimation Wald’s test.  
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compared to a 0.25 hour increase for their husbands (Row 3, columns 3, 4, 7, 8). Presence 
of daughters-in-law reduces wives' total workdays by almost 1.5 hours. This is a stronger 
effect than that of own income-earning hours, even after controlling for own children and 
age. The effects are nil and insignificant for husbands once controls have been added. 
Thus, care work is a major factor explaining wives' longer work days even after 
accounting for income-earning hours, and family composition, especially the presence of 
daughters-in-law, is the channel via which women reduce care work hours rather than 
income-earning hours. 
 The differences in care and total work hours between Adivasis and Dalits are 
greater than those between Dalits and Others, without controls (row 5, and row 6 minus 
row 5 respectively). These differences become much smaller, even insignificant, once the 
best-available controls for household wealth such as land possessed and quality of 
housing are added. However, behavioral responses by social group do vary significantly, 
especially the response of total hours to income-earning hours by social groups as seen in 
Table 5. 
 Table 5 reports coefficients of regression on total work hours disaggregated by 
social group as well as the difference between coefficients.22  This comparison by groups 
allows me to measure the influence of norms on the responses of care and total work to 
key variables.  Among wives, barring the presence of daughters-in-law, Dalit slope 
coefficients are closer, even identical, to Others' rather than to Adivasis.  At the margin, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I do not report coefficients for care work hours here as these can be deduced from coefficients for total 
work hours. Since care work plus income-earning work is total work, once we control for own income-
earning hours, the coefficients of all variables in the model of total work hours are the same as those in the 
model for care work hours, except for own income-earning hours) . The coefficient for income-earning 
hours in the models for total work would be one minus the coefficient of income-earning hours from 
models with care work.  
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an hour of income-earning work adds significantly less to the total workday of Adivasis 
(0.34 hours) compared to Dalits and Others (0.46, 0.45), meaning Adivasi wives make 
slightly larger trade-offs between income-earning and care work compared to Dalit and 
Other wives (row 1).23  The difference in responses to unit increase in child-dependent 
ratios is higher  -- 0.50 hours increase in Adivasi wives' hours of work compared to 0.83 
and 0.79 respectively (row 3). Both Adivasis and Dalits rely less on daughters-in-law 
compared to Others, and yet the differences between Adivasis and Dalits, as well as 
Dalits and Others are not significant (row 4).  
 Among husbands (including Adivasis), hours of work are not responsive to their 
spouse's income-earning hours (row 2). Like their wives, Adivasi husbands make higher 
trade-offs between income-earning work and care work compared to Dalits and others; 
and the difference between Adivasi and Dalit husbands is significant. Thus at the margin, 
Adivasi men are not doing more care work to support wives' higher income-earning 
hours. And yet, even as Adivasi wives face pressures to “do care,” both Adivasi wives 
and husbands seem to have less time-intensive parenting strategies. This is consistent 
with my qualitative finding that there are important cultural differences in the emphasis 
on care work. In particular, Adivasi women are less compelled to provide direct care such 
as supervising older children's eating compared to non-Adivasi wives.   
 An important caveat here is that the ITUS has a limited set of variables measuring 
wealth so I cannot fully control for wealth differences.  Nevertheless, the results that 
Adivasi wives devote more time to income-earning activities compared to Dalits (another 
poor social group) suggests that there may be something culturally intrinsic to being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For one income-earning hour, Adivasi women reduce care work by 0.66 hour; and Dalits and Other 
wives by 0.54 and 0.55 hours.  
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Adivasi that allows women to substitute more income-earning work for care work.  
Similarly, Dalits' behavioral responses of care work to paid work hours are closer to all 
non-Adivasi-non-Dalit groups demonstrating the cultural affinity between these groups 
on “doing care”. 
 My findings that rural Indian women's income-earning hours are positively 
associated with their total work hours with are not entirely comparable to the studies 
testing bargaining power versus “doing gender” reviewed in Section 2. Most of these 
studies test the impact of couples' relative earnings rather than women's income earning 
hours, and I lack information on relative earnings. Studies that consider the effects of 
paid work hours find a negative effect on time devoted to household chores alone in 
Australian and US datasets (- 0.19 and -0.12, and -0.91 respectively), and no such 
substitutability in China and Taiwan (-0.02 and -0.05 respectively) (Bittman et al 2003, 
Baxter and Hewitt 2013, Yu and Xie 2011). However, it is not clear whether there is 
sufficient substitution of time to all care work with time to paid work in order to reduce 
hours of total work. In Spain, women's share of child-care time does not vary with their 
spouses' relative income (Sevilla-Sanz, Giminez-Nadal and Fernandez 2010).  While the 
variation in substitutability between paid work and household chores per se between US, 
Australia, China, and Taiwan indicate differences in bargaining and norms in these 
contexts. My regression results show that married women in rural India are unable to 
substitute income-earning work for care work to reduce total hours of work. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I offer an explanation of why married women in rural India work 
longer days than their husbands. By investigating whether qualitative patterns directly 
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observed in study villages are generalizable across a larger secondary sample from a 
different year, my chapter also highlights the complementary nature of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. In particular, participant observation and interview methods 
allowed me to juxtapose cultural norms, practices of separation, and gender roles with 
patterns of time use. 
 My findings demonstrate that married women in rural India who engage in 
income-earning activities find it difficult to significantly reduce the time they devote to 
family care. If husbands are unwilling to assist, wives risk compromising dependents 
subsistence needs. They may also fear domestic violence. Some older women are able to 
reduce their care work burden and hence length of workday by delegating responsibilities 
to daughters-in-law. Even among Adivasis – a social group with less binding gender 
norms compared to other groups  – women's income-earning work lengthens their 
workdays. At the same time, Adivasi women cope with their work burdens by being less 
responsive to child-dependent ratios and prioritizing some forms of indirect care (meal 
preparation) over direct care (feeding older children). 
   I apply my theory of  “doing care” to argue that the urgency of subsistence needs 
and responsibility for care in a low-wage rural economy needs to be included while 
examining the substitutability between income-earning and care work. Such 
consideration allows for a perspective on bargaining and norms that is more applicable to 
contexts where exit from marriage is difficult, and the presence of other women more 
pertinent than hours of paid work. This perspective is also relevant to assessing trade-offs 
between paid and unpaid work in other countries where exit from marriage is difficult.  In 
western, developed nations, women who can afford to do so hire other women or buy 
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market-purchased inputs such as restaurant meals to reduce their care work hours. Poorer 
women may adopt less time-intensive caring strategies to make ends meet, especially in 
the absence of adequate social safety nets. “Doing care” could help explain why they are 
disempowered in the absence of supportive partners, and institutions that support care 
work.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DAUGHTERS, SONS, AND MOTHERS’ CARE WORK IN RURAL INDIA  
 
Introduction 
           Although women are typically assigned care responsibilities, most research on time 
spent on childcare focuses on mothers. Less attention has been directed towards children 
either as recipients or providers of childcare, especially in the South Asian context. Yet, 
the gendering of family responsibilities tends to begin at an early age. Daughters may 
provide their mothers with more assistance with care work than sons. Daughters may also 
receive less care from their mothers than sons both as a result of cultural norms of son 
preference and because they are encouraged to take care of themselves.  
           In this paper, I test these hypotheses using the Indian Time Use Survey 1998-99 
(ITUS). My analysis builds on previous research by Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney 
(2014), which uses the ITUS to show that households with only one infant boy spend 30 
minutes more on child care on average compared to households with only one infant girl. 
However, my analysis differs in two important respects. First, I focus on maternal time to 
care instead of household care time because I want to assess how maternal care time is 
affected by the gender of their children. Second, I consider how differential treatment 
between boys and girls extends beyond receiving care to provision of care. Evidence 
from both developing and developed countries suggests that older children, especially 
daughters, help mothers with household chores and the care of their younger siblings. For 
this reason, I investigate both the effect of gender of young children on mother's time 
devoted to child care, and, given the presence of young children, the effect of gender of 
older children on mothers time to child care and to other household work respectively. 
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           In the following discussion, I clarify the definition of care work, and review 
previous research relevant to gender and time use in rural developing country contexts. 
This review highlights the gaps in the study by Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney (2014), 
and also motivates my value-added in considering the allocation of care work to 
daughters over sons. Unlike Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney (2014), I also explore some 
factors relevant to son preference. Applying my theory of “doing care”, I argue that 
mothers without other female adults in the household will have relatively lower hours of 
child care and/or of indirect care when they have older daughters than when they have 
older sons. Drawing upon theories of son preference, I also argue that mothers may be 
less swayed by norms of son preference if they benefit from the assistance of daughters. 
Indeed, my results show no difference in the time spent on care between mothers who 
have only one son under 6 and only one daughter under 6. However, I find mothers with 
at least one older daughter aged 6-17 years old do 30 minutes less of indirect care work 
compared to mothers with no daughters and only sons aged 6-17 years.  While the latter 
result may be due to sons aged 6-17 receiving more care than daughters aged 6-17, my 
results indicate that research on parents' differential treatment of boys and girls in terms 
of care-giving should consider how older daughters help mothers with care-giving. 
Review of literature 
             As discussed in my first chapter, components of care work include hands-on 
childcare and indirect care i.e. household care, fetching water and firewood, etc. 24 
Childcare and indirect care are not always compatible. For instance, it would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Care work is defined as meeting the physiological needs of household members such as food, water, 
sanitation, shelter as well as emotional nurturance. Childcare entails hands on physical care and emotional 
nurturance provided to children. It includes supervisory care, which is underestimated in the ITUS as 
discussed in the first dissertation essay. Indirect care is composed of those unpaid tasks that indirectly 
support physiological wellbeing such as cooking, cleaning, and fetching drinking water.  
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extremely challenging for mothers to attempt breastfeeding, or even holding children, 
simultaneously with physically onerous tasks such as carrying heavy bundles of fodder 
and firewood (Davanzo and Lee 1983, Desai and Jain 1994, Short et al 2002). As a result, 
mothers have to rely to some extent on substitute caregivers. 
 Surveys from developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s show that mothers 
often relied on older daughters to help provide childcare as they themselves did indirect 
care and/or participated in paid work (Ho 1979, Chaudhury 1982, Engle 1989, Desai and 
Jain 1994, Tiefenthaler 1997). While most of these studies are dated and limited to a 
specific village, or province, they also represent diverse methods and illustrate the 
importance of older female children as substitute caregivers. For instance, Desai and Jain 
(1994) use data on activities pursued in the previous 24 hours gathered in 1990-91 from 
Kanakpura, South India. Their results show that children received, on average, 3.9 hours 
of childcare daily from substitute caregivers even when mothers were not engaged in 
income-earning work.25 Another study from Sylhet, Bangladesh used a 24 hour recall 
time diaries collected during 1979-80 to demonstrate that mothers relied far more on 
older female children than male children. Older female children provided three times 
more care than older male children if their younger siblings were not infants under 2, 
and/or their mothers were engaged in income-earning work (Chaudhury 1982). Analysis 
of information on activities in the previous week collected in 1975 from the Laguna 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 An issue with the Desai and Jain study is that they are not consistent with their measure of child care in 
the relevant Table i.e. Table 6 that shows average hours of childcare provided by mothers, and by substitute 
caregivers by the hours of market work (income-earning work) of mothers. The average hours spent by 
mothers is lower than that of substitute caregivers. However, whereas the hours spent by mothers is a 
narrower measure of time spent on activities such as feeding and bathing of children, the hours spent by 
substitute care-givers also includes supervisory care (watching children while simultaneously doing other 
activities) as well as hands-on care such as holding and playing with children. This may be due to the 
limitations on how the questions themselves were worded. 	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province in the Philippines shows that number of children aged 10 and above has a 
negative effect on mothers' time to all care work. The effects of older siblings on mothers 
care work were stronger when they had younger siblings under the age of 6 (Ho 1979). 
Yet another study from the Philippines using similar methods collected data from the 
Cebu province in 1983-84 and finds that older daughters in particular spend more than 
twice the average time than similarly aged sons helping mothers with child care and other 
work (Tifenthaler 1997). Clearly both the number and gender of older siblings matters for 
mothers' time to child care and to other care work.  
 Even in the United States, recent time diary studies show that daughters do 
more household work than sons (Gager and Sanchez 2004).  A meta-review of studies on 
whether American parents treated their daughters differently than sons in several 
different types of interactions involving both parents and children finds no clear evidence 
of gender differentiated treatment of children except on one count; parents encouraged 
gender-stereotyped housework activities for their children (Raley and Bianchi 2006, 
Lytton and Romney 1991 in Raley and Bianchi 2000). 
 The gender of children also matters for the amount of care received. Sons seem to 
receive more parental care time than daughters, especially from fathers. Lundberg 
attributes the term 'son preference' to either the desire to have sons rather than daughters, 
or the tendency to discriminate in favor of sons and against daughters in the allocation of 
resources (Lundberg 2005: 342). Since American parents seem to prefer a child of each 
gender, the term son preference is seldom heard in the US. Yet, evidence suggests that 
children's gender affects how much time and goods they receive from parents.  Fathers' 
time investments in particular tend to be higher when they have sons (Lundberg 2005, 
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Hiedemann, Joesch and Rose 2004, Raley and Bianchi 2006, Mammen 2011).  As Raley 
and Bianchi argue, mothers' are less likely to vary their time allocation by the gender of 
children because mothers are more involved in the hands-on care for young children, 
especially in activities that do not vary by gender. Fathers spend less time with children 
and gravitate towards sons with whom they are more likely to share interests (2006). 
Indeed, data from the 2003 American Time Use Survey shows that the gender of children 
has weak to negligible effects on mothers' time use, but fathers spend more time on their 
sons compared to their daughters. Sons not only received more time from fathers 
compared to their sisters, they also receive more time from their fathers than daughters in 
all-girl families received from theirs' (Mammen 2011).  
 Evidence on outcomes related to son preference is mixed in India. On the one 
hand, Indian parents appear to prefer sons to daughters; on the other hand, empirical 
analysis does not always confirm that girls receive fewer resources than boys. The 2011 
Indian Census shows that there are 918 girls for every 1000 boys for children aged 6 or 
below and the deficit of girls is much larger (890-830) in several states.26 These adverse 
juvenile sex ratios have been attributed to sex-selective abortions, female infanticide, and 
higher female child mortality with girls receiving less nutrition, and health care (Jha et al 
2011, Kaur 2008, Vishwanathan 2000, 2004, Dasgupta et al 2002, Lundberg 2005, Sudha 
and Rajan 1999).27 However, several empirical studies show that girls do not necessarily 
receive fewer resources than boys. For instance, Deaton (1997) tests whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Accessed on July 17th, 2017. https://community.data.gov.in/child-sex-ratio-0-6-years-for-statesuts-
based-on-census-2011-and-goal-for-eleventh-plan-period-2011-12/ 
27 Adult sex ratios are also adverse with respect to women. There are 933 women for every 1000 men in 
India according to the 2011 census with variance across states. At the one end, there are Haryana and 
Daman and Diu with 861 and 710 women for every 1000 men respectively, and at the other there is Kerala 
with 1058 women for every 1000 men. Data accessed from 
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/fsex.aspx on July 17th, 2017. 
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expenditures on goods such as alcohol and tobacco is lower for households with boys 
than household with girls, hypothesizing that households with boys might shift 
consumption from 'adult goods' to 'child goods'. He finds no significant evidence of such 
a shift. Further, on reviewing studies from several countries including India, Deaton 
concludes that there is little evidence in support of this hypothesis  (Deaton 1997 in 
Lundberg 2005).28 He does not, however, explore time allocation. 
 Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney (2014) are the first to examine 'son preference' in 
terms of time use in addition to goods and they find evidence that sons receive more time 
as well as other resources from household members. They also argue that the gender 
differential treatment of children in India could be underestimated when other differences 
in family characteristics due to son preference are not accounted for.  If fertility choices 
are influenced by son preference such that parents continue having children until they 
have one or more sons, then daughters are more likely be in larger families (Yamaguchi 
1989, Jensen 2005 in Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney 2014). In this case, daughters may 
receive less care because they are in larger families with fewer resources available per 
child rather than as a result of parental preferences. Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney argue 
that controlling for family size accounts for resources per child, but given the family size, 
the average girl may come from a family that does not necessarily prefer more sons 
(Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney 2014: 162). In other words, there is a selection bias. 
With the prevalence of practices such as sex-selective abortions and female infanticide, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Implicit here are gender differences in parental expenditures. There is a wealth of intra-household 
literature on how fathers spend more on such adult goods, and mothers more on food, health care and 
education for children. See for instance, Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman (1997).	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the most extreme form of son preference is that girls are simply not born, and girls that 
survive are more likely to be in families that do not discriminate against girls.  
 Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney use the empirical strategy of comparing 
households that have only one infant daughter to those that have only one infant son. The 
assumption here is that a child's sex is randomly determined at birth in the absence of 
sex-selective abortions, and the authors admit there is no getting around the selection bias 
resulting from sex-selective abortions. Limiting the sample to households with the 
youngest child being 1 year or less does, however, allow for an examination of those 
households that have not yet responded to the child's gender by having more children or 
capping the number of children. The sample restriction also allows to pinpoint the 
children receiving care  – since the ITUS measures how much time respondents spend on 
child care and not how much care a given child receives, the youngest child is most likely 
to receive time spent on care by household members. Using the ITUS 1998-99, Barcellos, 
Muney and Carvalho find that among rural households with just one child under a year 
old and no other children under 6, households with just one infant boy spent roughly 60 
minutes more per day on child care compared to households with just one infant girl. 
Using data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from 1992, (before 
ultra-sound technology became widely available), the authors also show that infant boys 
under 15 months were likely to be breastfed longer, and receive more vitamin 
supplements than infant girls less than 15 months. Infant boys received at least 10 percent 
more of these inputs than girls (Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney 2014: 159). 
  If daughters are more likely to be conscripted to the care of their siblings as the 
literature cited above suggests, then the differential treatment of daughters and sons with 
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respect to care encompasses both receiving and helping with care work.  Barcellos, 
Carvalho and Muney do not explore this issue, in part because they make an incorrect 
assumption regarding the ITUS. Their claim: “since, families cannot be identified, we can 
only identify the youngest child in the household (not in the family)” is not true (2014: 
173-4) because the ITUS codes each household member by their relationship to the 
household head.29 Further, their findings regarding care received by infant boys and girls 
may be inaccurate, since they arbitrarily exclude time use on some days (this is discussed 
further below). Therefore, it remains to be investigated whether mothers in particular 
spends less time on care when they have a young son compared to when they have a 
young daughter, as well as whether mothers' time to child care and indirect care varies by 
the gender of older children.  
Son preference and “Doing Care” 
  I bring together my theoretical perspective on “doing care” with theories of son 
preference to argue that norms of son preference may not influence mothers as much as 
fathers when daughters can reduce their care work burden. Examining the relative impact 
of sons and daughters on maternal time use requires considering the age at which children 
transition from being care recipients exclusively to being potential care providers. 
 In the first instance, age and gender of children are relevant to whether they are 
more likely to receive rather than help with care. Infants who are still breastfeeding are 
purely recipients of childcare. The older the children get, the less hands-on childcare they 
need and receive. Most able bodied children who are not infants but also not yet adults, 
especially girls, can help with childcare if they have younger siblings that require hands-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Since the ITUS codes each household member by their relationship to the household head, the children 
of household heads can be matched to their parents (household head, spouse of household head). 	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on care and supervision. In general, children will receive some direct care and also help 
with childcare when they are young enough to require some hands-on care but also old 
enough to supervise younger siblings. They may also help their mothers with simple tasks 
such as fetching water, smaller bundles of firewood, and washing dishes.   
 Son preference arises from the greater social value assigned to sons over 
daughters, which shapes families preference for male over female children as well as 
preferential treatment of sons in the allocation of household resources. For instance, 
norms of gender shaped by religion and laws designate sons as the bearer of the family 
name (Pande and Aston 2007, Arnold, Choe and Roy 1998). Rules of inheritance and 
marriage pass immovable property such as land through the male line, and other assets 
are given away as dowry to the families that daughters marry into (Lundberg 2005, Kaur 
2008, Dasgupta et al 2003). Women's standing within their husbands' families can be 
affected by their success in producing a son (Kaur 2008). Such norms, rules and practices 
shape cultural perception of sons as an asset and daughters a liability to the family.  
 Even as there is a rationale for parents to invest resources relatively more in sons 
than daughters, the gender differences between mothers and fathers may mean that son 
preference may not extend to mothers' time devoted to child care per se. Mothers' are 
more involved in childcare than fathers especially when children are young, and thus are 
more likely to form attachments to infants. Women also have relatively more discretion 
over their own time allocation than over household expenditures, which men typically 
control.  As Pande and Aston (2007) argue, son preference is more likely in extended 
families in which young mothers are more constrained in their reproductive choices and 
decision-making. Most importantly, mothers may value daughters more than fathers do 
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because daughters are more likely than sons to help them with family care 
responsibilities.      
  As argued in my first chapter, norms and practices around “doing care” make it 
difficult for women to gain assistance from men and lead them to rely on other women in 
the households. In the long run, daughters-in-law may be more important than daughters 
because they also take responsibility for elder care. Nonetheless, daughters may also 
provide considerable assistance when they co-reside with parents especially relative to 
sons.  
 This reasoning generates the following hypotheses:  
1. Contrary to Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney, time to child care will not be 
different for daughters and sons.  In particular, mothers will not allocate more 
time on young sons than young daughters, all else equal. 
2. Mothers' time devoted to child care in households with children under 6 will be 
lowered by the presence of older daughters more than by the presence of older 
sons, all else equal.  
3. Mothers’ time spent on indirect care will also be lowered by the presence of older 
daughters more than by the presence of older sons, all else equal. 
  These hypotheses are restated in the context of the dataset, my empirical strategy 
and the regression coefficients in the model I specify below. 
Dataset, model and hypotheses 
 The Indian Time Use Survey 1998-99 (ITUS) surveys all household members 
aged 6 and above in the previous 24 hours. The activities described during every hour 
were coded after the survey using a detailed activity classification of around 150 codes 
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grouped under 9 mutually exclusive broad categories. The broad categories and activity 
codes that come under the rubric of care work are “Household Maintenance, 
Management and Shopping for households”,  “Care for children, the sick, elderly and 
disabled in own household” and selected activity codes on fetching water, firewood, 
fodder and other forms of animal care. Keeping with the definitions I outlined above, 
direct care pertains to care for own household members and indirect care pertains to all 
other activities under care work. Within direct care, I separate activity codes specific to 
children from other household members to get total time spent on direct childcare alone. 
These include physical care of children, teaching children, accompanying children to 
places, supervising children with or without other activities and travel related to 
childcare.30 
 I calculate time spent on care work using all types of diary days given in the 
dataset. This is unlike Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney who restricted their sample only to 
“Normal days”. While it is true that almost all respondents have normal days, almost 40 
percent also have “weekly variant” and 4 percent also “abnormal days”. For this reason, 
following Hirway (2009), I use an algorithm that calculates time spent on any given 
activity as a weighted average of time spent on specific type of days (see technical 
appendix). This measure of time spent on an average day of the week avoids the bias of 
using only normal days  
 I restrict the sample to rural areas as this represents a distinct context, especially 
for indirect care work, like Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney (2014). However, unlike 
them, I restrict my sample to rural women married to household heads in particular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The values of time spent on supervisory care are very low. See Appendix C5. The measures of childcare 
for the Indian Time Use Survey capture hands-on care better and needs to be interpreted as such. 
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because their children can be identified and my aim is to assess how maternal care time 
varies by the gender and age composition of children.  Since the ITUS codes respondents 
by their relationship to the household head, children of male household heads can be 
matched to their mother (spouse of household head).31  As a result, I can analyze the   
differences between mothers who have an infant boy and an infant girl respectively, and 
between mothers who have older daughters and those who have older sons. I further 
restrict my sample to those wives of household heads who have only their husband and 
no other adult present because such a restriction allows me to parse out the effects of 
having at least one older daughter; effects that are bound to be larger in the absence of 
daughters-in-law and other adult care-givers. All my sample restrictions allow me to 
parse out the influence of children on mothers who are as similar as possible.32  
 First, I identify the cut-off age for younger and older children by plotting mothers' 
mean time devoted to childcare as well as indirect care against the age of their youngest 
child. Figure 3 shows mothers' mean time to child care declines asymptotically towards 
zero as the age of their youngest child declines from 1 to 17, with time to child care 
dropping off between 5 and 6 years. Wives with youngest child 5 years old spend on 
average 0.8 hours on childcare. Once the age of youngest child is 6, their mothers time on 
care work declines by half to 0.4, and keep declining asymptotically to almost 0.  
 Mothers' mean time spent on indirect care is invariant to the age of youngest child 
ranging between 6 to 7 hours average, and does not drop off. Based on these results, I 
refer to children aged 0-5 as young children who are likely to be recipients of child care, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 However, other children i.e. grandchildren cannot be identified to their parents (married sons, daughters-
in-law or married daughters of the household head). 	  
32 In future iterations, I intend to introduce actual hours worked by older daughters and sons, and the 
impact on mothers’ hours of work as well as the interactive effects between having daughters and 
daughters-in-law living in the household. 	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and children aged 6-17 years as older children who can potentially help their mothers 
with providing child care as well as indirect care. This is also consistent with the age 
limit of 6 years used by the ITUS to demarcate respondents to collect time use details 
from. 
 Next, I use regression analysis to estimate equations (1) – (3), which allows me to 
measure respectively (i) the effect of gender and number of younger children (0-5 years) 
on mothers' hours of child care (Ya), (ii) the effect of gender and number of older children 
(6-17 years) on mothers hours of child care (Ya), and (iii) the effect of gender and number 
if older children (6-17 years) on mothers hours of indirect care (Yb). Both equations (1) 
and (2) have mothers' child care as the dependent variable, but are estimated for mothers 
with younger children and mothers with older children respectively. These are subgroups 
of mothers that do not overlap entirely. 
Ya = α1 + Σβk1Dkc + αβ1Xβc + Σαi1Xi + Σαoβ1Xoβ + Σαγ1Xγ + µβ1 + ε1  --- (1) 
Ya = α1 + Σβk2Dkd + αβ2Xβd+ Σαi2Xi + Σαoβ2Xoβ + Σ Σαγ2Xγ + µ β2 + ε2   --- (2) 
Ya = α1 + Σβk3Dkd + αβ3Xβd+ Σαi3Xi + Σαoβ3Xoβ + Σ Σαγ3Xγ + µ β3 + ε3   --- (3); where the 
error terms are clustered at the household level, Dkc is the variable that categorizes wives 
by the gender and number of their children aged 0-5 in equation 1, and Dkd the gender 
and number of their children aged 6-17 in equations 2 and 3. For j={c,d} 
D1j: Only 1 girl and no boys  
D2j: Only 1 boy and no girls 
D3j: Only 2 girls and no boys 
D4j: Only 1 girl and only 1 boy 
D5j: Only 2 boys and no girls 
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Xβj: Presence of at least one child aged 6-17 (equation 1), or aged 0-5 (equation 2-3) 
Xi: Individual controls (whether wife had any income-earning hours or not, education)33 
Xoβ:Other household controls (social group i.e. whether Adivasi, Dalit or any other, 
whether land possessed is at least one acre or not, whether lived in a concrete house or 
not) 
Xγ: Region, type of day and season controls34	  	  
My hypotheses restated in terms of the regression coefficients would be 
1.  Among mothers with only one child under the age 6, there will be negligible 
differences between mothers with just one young daughter and mothers with just 
one young son.  Among mothers with two children under the age 6, there are 
negligible differences between mothers with only two sons, mothers with only 
one son and one daughter, and mothers with two daughters respectively: β21 = β11 
and β51 = β41 = β31, and βk1 > 0 
2. Since children could still be the net recipients of care, it remains an open 
question whether the influence of children 6-17 years is negative or positive on 
mothers' time to childcare and indirect care respectively. If the impacts are 
negative, then daughters aged 6 -17 years will have larger impacts on wives' 
direct child care and indirect care compared to sons aged 6-17 years. If the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 I do not add age as a control because the difference among women by stage of childbearing and rearing 
is measured more directly by the categorical variable of gender and age of young (or older) children and the 
number of older (or younger) children. Age has a strong positive correlation with the number of children.  
34 Since time use is measured on an “average day” of the week, the variables categorizing the previous 
week of the respondent, and the season respectively are included as controls. Seasons include Kharif (July-
Oct); Rabi (Nov-Feb) and summer (Mar-June).  Respondents "previous week" in the dataset entail feasible 
combinations of three different types of diary days --- ("normal", "weekly variant", "abnormal") --- in the 
five following categories: (i) all 7 are normal days- (7,0,0); (ii) all are normal and weekly variant days only 
- (6,1,0) (5,2,0); (iii) all are normal and abnormal days only - (6,0,1) (5,0,2); (iv) all three types of days - 
(0,1,6), (5,1,1) (4,1,2) (4,2,1) (3,2,2), and (v) all 7 are weekly variant days- (0,7,0) or all 7 are abnormal 
days- (0,0,7).	  
	   68 
impacts are positive, then daughters aged 6 -17 years will have smaller impacts 
or receive less net care compared to sons in the age 6-17 years:  
◦ Either β1i  < β2i < 0 and β3i < β4i   < β5i < 0;   
◦ Or β2i  > β1i > 0; and β5i > β4i  > β3i > 0; where i={2,3} and are coefficients 
pertinent to equations (2) and (3) respectively. 
Empirical results 
 Table 6 displays the summary statistics of the sample of all wives and also for the 
subsets of wives without any other adult disaggregated by the age composition of 
children alone i.e. whether there is at least one child under 6, or between 6-17, or both, or 
no children under 17. As expected and consistent with Figure 3, mothers' mean child care 
hours are lower as the age composition of children shifts towards older children and is the 
least for mothers with no children at all. Table 6 also shows that mothers with young 
children report child care hours that are lower by 30 minutes on average when they have 
older children present compared to when older children are not present (columns 1 and 2, 
Table 6). Mean hours of indirect care are the higher when mothers have older children 
(6.6, and 6.5 hours). However, the sum of mean hours of child care and mean hours of 
indirect care are still higher for mothers with young children at ~7.8 hours compared to 
6.8 and 6 hours for women with no young children, and no children at all.35 The rest of 
my empirical results show that once we control for both gender and number of children, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Table 2.1 also shows that sex ratios are the least when only older children are present. This is consistent 
with the lower mean age of marriage for girls at approximately 15 and for boys at 21. Sex ratios are the 
highest when both younger and older children are present. That is, girls are likely to be in a larger family, 
which is consistent with the desire for more sons, or stopping to have children once the desired number of 
boys are had. Mothers with both older and younger children are not very different on other counts; they are 
not less literate or less likely to be engaged in income-earning work. They are also not more poor in terms 
of the proportion belonging to low income groups such as Adivasis and Dalits, of those living in concrete 
house, and possessing 1 acre or more.	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is the presence of older daughters in particular that is associated with reduced hours of 
care work for their mothers. 
 Figure 4 (Plots 2.1 and 2.2) illustrate that controlling for the number of older 
children, mothers with only young daughters (and no young sons) report only the 
slightest difference in average hours of childcare compared to mothers with only young 
sons (and no young daughters). This is also true of the marginal decrease for every older 
child that these mothers have. Mothers of only young daughters report hours of child care 
lower by ~0.25 hours for every additional older child they have. This is true of mothers of 
only young sons with the exception of those who have three older children (the difference 
between mothers of only young sons with two older children, and three older children 
respectively is negligible). Thus, even if households may differentiate in the care given to 
daughters and sons as Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney (2014) find, my initial results 
show that mothers in particular do not give less care to daughters compared to sons.  
Nevertheless, Figure 4 do not control for the number of younger daughters or younger 
sons. Multivariate regression results presented further below examine this issue in greater 
detail.  
 Figure 5 (Plots 3.1 and 3.2) compare the average hours of child care of mothers 
with young children who only have older daughters (and no older brothers) and to 
mothers with younger children who only have older brothers (and no older sisters). Given 
the number of older children, mothers of younger children who have only older daughters 
spend marginally higher time on average compared to mothers who have only older sons. 
For instance, mothers of younger children with two older daughters spend 1.1 hours on 
childcare and mothers of younger children with two older sons spend 0.9 hours on 
	   70 
childcare. The difference is even smaller between mothers of young children with 3 
daughters and with 3 sons respectively.  
 While older daughters do not seem to affect their mothers' hours of childcare, they 
do affect their mothers' hours of indirect care as evident from Figure 6 (Plots 3.3 and 3.4). 
Given at least one young child, mothers with only older daughters have lower hours of 
indirect care compared to mothers with only older sons. Mothers with young children and 
only one older daughter report an average of 6.4 indirect care hours and mothers with 
young children and three older daughters an average of ~ 6 hours (Figure 5, Plot 3.3). 
The corresponding figures for mothers with young children and older sons is 6.7 and ~7 
hours (Figure 5, Plot 3.4). In others words, older daughters are associated with lower 
hours of indirect care for mothers with young children compared to older sons.  
 The differences in maternal time to child care and indirect care by the number as 
well as gender composition of younger and older children remains robust controlling for 
a host of other factors.  After adding controls, regressing mothers hours of child care on 
the number and gender composition of younger children confirms that the difference 
between maternal time devoted to care when the youngest child is a girl under the age 6 
and a boy remains close to nil at 0.05 hours, or 3 minutes (Table 7). This difference is 
also statistically insignificant. Among mothers with only two children under 6, the 
difference between having two daughters and two sons respectively is 0.01 hours (0.6 
minutes) and statistically insignificant. However, mothers with one young daughter and 
one young son spend 0.17 hours (10 minutes) more than mothers with two young 
daughters, and two young sons respectively (Table 7, rows 1.1-1.5). While the difference 
between mothers with one young daughter and one young son on the one hand, and two 
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daughters or two sons on the other is still small, it is statistically significant and suggests 
that maternal care time is rival when mothers have a young son and a young daughter.  
 Regressing mothers hours of child care and indirect care respectively on the 
number and gender composition of older children confirms that daughters entail fewer 
hours of indirect care hours for their mothers' compared to sons (Table 8). For maternal 
time devoted to childcare, the impacts of older children are negative. However, the 
differences between mothers of daughters and mothers of sons are in the range of 3-5 
minutes, and statistically insignificant except for the difference between mothers with 
two older daughters and two older sons. For maternal time devoted to indirect care, the 
impacts of older children are positive with smaller impacts for daughters. Mothers' with 
only one older daughter (no older sons) do 19 minutes less of than mothers' with only one 
older son (no older daughters). Mothers with only two older daughters do 19 minutes less 
compared to mothers with one older son and one older daughter, but the difference is 
statistically insignificant. However, the difference between mothers of two older 
daughters and mothers of two older sons is 46 minutes, and between mothers with one 
older son and one older daughter and two older sons is almost half an hours, and these 
differences are statistically significant. In short, either the presence of each additional 
daughter shaves off 20 minutes of indirect care work of mothers on average, or the 
presence of each older son is associated with an additional 20 minutes of indirect care 
work for mothers on average. 
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Conclusion 
 This paper builds on the work of Barcellos, Carvalho and Muney (2014), and goes 
beyond it by considering how “doing care” complicates the occurrence of son preference 
in practice. Mothers could be less influenced by son preference than fathers because 
daughters are more likely to assist with care responsibilities. On the one hand, both 
fathers and mothers may desire sons more than daughters due to powerful norms of son 
preferences; on the other, norms of “doing care” may mean that once daughters are born, 
there may be no difference between maternal care devoted to children.  Since women are 
culturally assigned to care work, mothers form attachments to infants and also expect that 
daughters are more likely to help with care work than sons.  While the absence of 
discrimination in childcare time does not mean the absence of son preference per se, it 
does suggest that mothers and fathers may manifest son preference in distinct ways. 
 Evidence from the ITUS supports my hypotheses and the underlying analysis can 
be extended in several respects to strengthen my arguments. These extensions are the 
basis for future iterations of this paper. One, since all household members aged 6 or 
above are surveyed for their time use, I will examine the impact of older children's hours 
of care work on their mothers hours of care work to assess if daughters hours have 
negative effect that is at least larger than a negative effect of boys. Two, given the 
cultural differences between the low income groups Adivasis and Dalits, where Adivasis 
tend to be relatively relaxed on norms of gender and doing care, it is also worth 
examining whether Dalit mothers and all others mothers give more child care time to 
sons than to daughters, and whether Adivasi mothers rely on their daughters relatively 
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more than Dalit and all others mothers. These extensions would add to the robustness of 
my arguments on the interaction between son preference and “doing care”.  
 Such empirical analysis is relevant to understanding how “doing care” limits the 
opportunity of girls to receive formal training and the kind of jobs that could allow them 
to reduce the time burden of care work, as they grow older. Norms around “doing care” 
that hold women responsible for care work generates time burden for girls, and not just 
for older women. If girls are expected to help with household chores and the care of 
younger siblings more than sons, then daughters are also less likely to attend school. My 
research shows that girls helping their mothers to provide care must be accounted for in 
studies on the differential treatment of boys and girls in allocation of resources in 
households. 	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APPENDIX A 
	  
TABLES 
	  
Table 1: Average hours spent on care work, income-earning work and all work  
Panel A: Including zero hours of work 
  Wives' hours  
(N=10308) 
Husbands' 
hours  
(N=10308) 
 Difference between wives' 
and husbands' hours  
1 All work 10.0 
(0.03) 
8.4 
(0.03) 
1.5*** 
(0.03) 
2 Care work 6.7 
(0.03) 
0.7 
(0.01) 
6*** 
(0.03) 
3 All income-earning  
work 
3.3 
(0.03) 
7.7 
(0.03) 
-4.4*** 
(0.04) 
3.1 Unpaid but income-earning 
work 
1.6 
(0.02) 
3.1 
(0.03 
-1.5*** 
(0.03) 
3.2 Paid work 1.7 
(0.03) 
4.6 
(0.04) 
-2.9*** 
(0.04) 
Panel B: Excluding zero hours of work 
  Wives' hours  
 
Husbands' 
hours  
 
% Wives 
with 
hours 
worked > 
0 
%  
husbands 
with hours 
worked > 
0 
Differenc
e 
between 
wives' 
and 
husbands' 
hours 
1 All work 10.1 
(2.6) 
8.7 
(2.4) 
99.5 97.5 1.4*** 
(0.03) 
2 Care Work 6.8 
(2.8) 
1.3 
(1.3) 
98.8 57.5 5.7*** 
(0.04) 
3 All income-earning  
work 
4.4 
(2.9) 
8.1 
(2.3) 
75.2 95.8 -3.8*** 
(0.04) 
3.1 Unpaid but income-earning 
work 
2.5 
(2.2) 
3.7 
(3.4) 
59.7 79.6 -1.7*** 
(0.04) 
3.2 Paid work 4.4 
(2.8) 
6.7 
(2.7) 
38.9 69.6 -2.4*** 
(0.05) 
Note: Hours of work are measured by time spent on an “average day” (see Appendix C3 for details on 
how “average day” is calculated.). All work (Row 1) is the sum of care work (Row 2) and income-earning 
work (Row 3). All income-earning work (Row 3) is the sum of unpaid but income-earning work (Row 
3.1) and paid work (Row 3.2). The standard errors from T-Test of difference of means are reported in the 
parentheses in Panel A. Panel B gives hours worked for wives and husbands excluding zero values, with 
SDs reported in parentheses below. The difference between husbands and wives are based on T-Tests that 
include only those husband-wife pairs who both have non-zero values, and the parentheses below report 
standard errors. The % of wives and husbands who worked respectively do not add up to 100% because 
some respondents do both care and income-earning work, or both paid and unpaid work.  
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Table 2: Average time spent in all work and care work for married persons with 
and without daughter(s)-in-law, and by social group  	  
  Wives' hours of work Husbands' hours 
of work 
Care  
work 
Income-
earning 
work 
Total  
work 
Care  
work 
Income-
earning 
work 
Total  
work 
	   	  
 Panel 1       	   	  
1 No daughter-in-law 
lives in household 
(n=8993) 
7.1 
(0.03) 
3.2 
(0.03) 
10.2 
(0.03) 
0.8 
(0.01) 
7.8 
(0.03) 
8.6 
(0.03) 
	   	  
2 At least one 
daughter-in-law lives 
in household 
(n=1315) 
4.5 
(0.08) 
3.7 
(0.09) 
8.3 
(0.09) 
0.6 
(0.03) 
7.0 
(0.09) 
7.6 
(0.08) 
	   	  
3 Difference between 
1 and 2 
2.5*** 
(0.08) 
-0.6*** 
(0.09) 
1.9*** 
(0.08) 
0.2*** 
(0.04) 
0.8*** 
(0.8) 
1.0*** 
(0.08) 
	   	  
 Panel 2       	   	  
4 Adivasi (n=1915) 6.6 
(0.07) 
4.2 
(0.07) 
10.8 
(0.05) 
1.0 
(0.03) 
7.8 
(0.06) 
8.8 
(0.05) 
	   	  
5 Dalit (n=1926) 6.5 
(0.07) 
3.4 
(0.07) 
9.9 
(0.06) 
0.8 
(0.03) 
7.4 
(0.06) 
8.2 
(0.06) 
	   	  
6 Other (n=6467) 6.8 
(0.04) 
2.9 
(0.03) 
9.7 
(0.04) 
0.7 
(0.01) 
7.7 
(0.04) 
8.4 
(0.03) 
	   	  
7 Difference between 
Adivasi and Dalit  
0.1 
(0.1) 
0.8*** 
(0.1) 
0.9*** 
(0.08) 
0.2*** 
(0.04) 
0.4*** 
(0.08) 
0.6*** 
(0.03) 
	   	  
8 Difference between 
Dalit and Other  
-0.3*** 
(0.07) 
0.5*** 
(0.07) 
0.2*** 
(0.07) 
0.1*** 
(0.03) 
-0.3** 
(0.07) 
-0.2** 
(0.07) 
	   	  
Note: Hours of work are measured by time spent on an “average day”. Hours of work 
include zeros and hence are averages over population of all women, men, wives and 
husbands respectively. All work is the sum of care work and income-earning work. In Panel 
1, married couples were distinguished by whether there was at least one daughter-in-law 
present in the household, or not. The standard errors from t-test of difference of means 
between women (or their husbands) who had no daughter-in-law and those who had at least 
one daughter-in-law are reported in the parentheses.  In Panel 2, their social group 
distinguished married couples. The standard errors from t-test of difference of means 
between Adivasi and Dalits (or Dalits and Others) are reported in the parentheses. Statistical 
significance of differences at 1, 5 and 10 percent are represented by ***, **, * respectively 
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Table 3: OLS regression with income-earning hours as independent variable for 
wives and husbands  
	  	   Wife's care work 
hours 
(1) 
Wife's total work 
hours 
(2) 
Husband's care 
work hours 
(3) 
Husband's total work 
hours 
(4) 
Wife's income-
earning hours 
-0.56*** 
(0.008) 
0.44*** 
(0.008) 
  
Husband's 
income-earning 
hours 
  -0.14*** 
(0.008) 
0.86*** 
(0.008) 
Constant 8.62*** 
(0.04) 
8.62*** 
(0.04) 
1.81*** 
(0.07) 
1.80*** 
(0.07) 
R2 0.37 0.26 0.11 0.83 
Notes: N=10308 in all four models. Hours of work are measured by time spent on an “average day”, see 
Appendix  for details on how “average day” is calculated. Hours of work include zeros. All work is the 
sum of care work and income-earning work. Statistical significance of coefficients at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
are represented by ***, **, * respectively. Parentheses contain heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors.  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   77 
Table 4: Marginal hours - Change in care and	  total work hours associated with unit 
increase of independent variables (continued onto next page) 
 	   Wife's 
care 
work 
hours 
 
(1) 
Wife's 
total 
work 
hours 
 
(2) 
Wife's 
care 
work 
hours 
 
(3) 
Wife's 
total 
work 
hours 
 
(4) 
Husband's 
care work 
hours 
(5) 
Husband's 
total work 
hours 
(6) 
Husband's 
care work 
hours 
(7) 
Husband'
s total 
work 
hours 
(8) 
 
Own income-  
earning hours 
 
-0.58*** 
(0.01) 
 
0.42*** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.57*** 
(0.01) 
 
0.43*** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.15*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.85*** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.16*** 
(0.01) 
 
0.84** 
(0.01) 
Spouses' 
income-earning 
hours 
0.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.01*** 
(0.005) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
Own-child-to-
adult ratios 
1.03*** 
(0.05) 
1.03*** 
(0.05) 
0.74*** 
(0.06) 
0.74*** 
(0.06) 
0.36*** 
(0.03) 
0.36*** 
(0.03) 
0.25*** 
(0.03) 
0.25*** 
(0.03) 
At least one 
daughter-in-law 
co-resides 
-1.61*** 
(0.08) 
-1.61*** 
(0.08) 
-1.46*** 
(0.09) 
-
1.46*** 
(0.09) 
-0.19*** 
(0.04) 
-0.19*** 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
Social group:  
Dalit  
-0.48*** 
(0.08) 
-0.48*** 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.19*** 
(0.05) 
-0.19*** 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Social group: 
Others  
-0.31*** 
(0.07) 
-0.31*** 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
 
0.02 
(0.04) 
 
Age   0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
  0.03*** 
(0.006) 
0.03*** 
(0.006) 
Age squared   0.00*** 
(0.000) 
0.00*** 
(0.000) 
  0.00*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0001) 
Wife's 
education:  
Primary 
  0.072 
(0.19) 
0.072 
(0.19) 
    
Middle    -0.22* 
(0.11) 
-0.22* 
(0.11) 
    
Secondary   0.07 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.19) 
    
Higher 
secondary and 
above 
  -0.10 
(0.23) 
-0.10 
(0.23) 
    
Husband's 
education: 
Primary  
  0.06 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
  0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Middle    0.23* 
(0.08) 
0.23* 
(0.08) 
  0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
Secondary   0.08 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
  0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
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Higher 
secondary and 
above 
  -0.05 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
  0.07 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
Does not live in 
mud house  
  -0.11* 
(0.06) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
  0.0003 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.03) 
Land possessed 
> 1 acre 
  0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
  0.036 
(0.03) 
0.033 
(0.03) 
Type of day: 
Normal and 
weekly 
variant 
  0.05 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
  0.26*** 
(0.03) 
0.26*** 
(0.03) 
Normal and 
Abnormal  
  -0.07 
(0.15) 
-0.07 
(0.15) 
  0.15** 
(0.07) 
0.15** 
(0.07) 
All three days   -0.36* 
(0.19) 
-0.36* 
(0.19) 
  0.15* 
(0.08) 
0.16* 
(0.08) 
Weekly variant 
and abnormal 
  -2.0 
(1.4) 
-2.0 
(1.4) 
  1.65 
(1.17) 
1.83* 
(1.17) 
Season: Winter 
'98-'99 
  0.56*** 
(0.06) 
0.56*** 
(0.06) 
  0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
Summer '99   0.60*** 
(0.06) 
0.60*** 
(0.06) 
  0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Other seasons   0.62*** 
(0.11) 
0.62*** 
(0.11) 
  0.17*** 
(0.06) 
0.17*** 
(0.06) 
State:  
Haryana 
  0.36*** 
(0.10) 
0.36*** 
(0.10) 
  -0.22*** 
(0.05) 
-0.22*** 
(0.05) 
Gujarat   0.73*** 
(0.07) 
0.73*** 
(0.07) 
  -0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
Orissa   0.58*** 
(0.08) 
0.58*** 
(0.08) 
  0.28*** 
(0.05) 
0.28*** 
(0.05) 
Tamilnadu   -0.63** 
(0.08) 
-0.63** 
(0.08) 
  -0.15*** 
(0.03) 
-0.15*** 
(0.03) 
Meghalaya   0.54*** 
(0.16) 
0.54*** 
(0.16) 
  0.71*** 
(0.12) 
0.71*** 
(0.12) 
Constant  7.64*** 
(0.10) 
7.64*** 
(0.10) 
6.58*** 
(0.28) 
6.58*** 
(0.28) 
1.91*** 
(0.29) 
1.93*** 
(0.09) 
1.17*** 
(0.15) 
1.18*** 
(0.15) 
R2  0.48 0.39 0.53 0.45 0.14 0.83 0.19 0.84 
Notes: N=10303 in all models. Hours of work include zeros, and measured by time spent on an “average 
day”. All work is the sum of care work and income-earning work. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 
percent represented by ***, **, * respectively. Parentheses contain heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors. Own-child-to-adult ratios are those of couples' children aged 0-5 to all adults aged 15-75 who also 
live in the same household. At least one daughter-in-law co-resides is a binary. Social group (reference: 
Adivasis). Controls: age, education (reference: not literate), does not live in mud house (reference: live in 
mud house), land possessed is above 1 acre or above (reference: land possessed is less than 1 acre); state 
(reference: Madhya Pradesh), type of day (reference: all normal days) and season (reference: rainy season 
1998).  
 
	   79 
Table 5: Marginal hours - Change in care and	  total work hours associated with unit 
increase of independent variables for each social group (continued onto next page) 
 
 Wife's total work hours Husband's total work hours 
 Adivasi 
(1) 
Dalit 
(2) 
Others 
(3) 
Adivasi 
(4) 
Dalit 
(5) 
Others 
(6) 
Own income-earning hours 0.34*** 
(0.02) 
0.46*** 
(0.02) 
0.45*** 
(0.01 
0.76*** 
(0.03) 
0.86*** 
(0.02) 
0.85*** 
(0.01) 
Difference in coefficients: 
Dalit and Adivasi 
 0.12***   0.1***  
Difference in coefficients: 
Dalit and Others 
  0.01   0.01 
Spouses' income-earning 
hours 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.008) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
Difference in coefficients: 
Dalit and Adivasi 
 0.03   0.02  
Difference in coefficients: 
Dalit and Others 
  0   0.01 
Own-child-to -adult ratios 0.50*** 
(0.11) 
0.83*** 
(0.11) 
0.79*** 
(0.08) 
0.19*** 
(0.08) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
0.27*** 
(0.04) 
Difference in coefficients: 
Dalit and Adivasi 
 0.33**   0.02  
Difference in coefficients: 
Dalit and Others 
  0.04   0.06 
At least one daughter-in-
law co-resides 
-1.35*** 
(0.20) 
-1.25*** 
(0.23) 
-1.5*** 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
Difference in coefficients: 
Dalit and Adivasi 
 -0.1   0.02  
Difference in coefficients: 
Dalit and Others 
  -0.25   0.01 
Age 0.05 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.037** 
(0.019) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.007) 
Age squared -0.00* 
(0.0005) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.00*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.00** 
(0.0002) 
-0.00* 
(0.0001) 
-0.00** 
(0.00008) 
Wife's education:  
Primary  
-0.30** 
(0.14) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
   
Middle  -0.08 
(0.32) 
0.18 
(0.28) 
-0.26** 
(0.13) 
   
Secondary 0.12 
(0.40) 
-0.26 
(0.38) 
0.09 
(0.22) 
   
Higher secondary and above -0.30 
(0.77) 
0.42 
(0.52) 
-0.20 
(0.25) 
   
Husband's education: 
Primary  
0.37*** 
(0.11) 
0.18 
(0.12) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
0.15** 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
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Middle  0.49*** 
(0.20) 
0.24 
(0.20) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
0.45*** 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
Secondary 0.05 
(0.35) 
0.74*** 
(0.21) 
-0.08 
(0.12) 
0.54* 
(0.29) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
Higher secondary and above 0.67* 
(0.41) 
-0.21 
(0.29) 
-0.17 
(0.15 
0.12 
(0.15) 
-0.83 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
Does not live in mud house  0.20 
(0.20) 
-0.34** 
(0.15) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.009 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Land possessed > 1 acre 0.08 
(0.11) 
0.25* 
(0.12) 
0.16*** 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
State:  
Haryana 
 0.38** 
(0.18) 
0.31*** 
(0.12) 
 -0.25*** 
(0.08) 
-0.17*** 
(0.06) 
Gujarat 0.76*** 
(0.13) 
0.90*** 
(0.24) 
0.65*** 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.10** 
(0.04) 
Orissa 0.84*** 
(0.14) 
0.77*** 
(0.19) 
0.33*** 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.1) 
0.32*** 
(0.10) 
0.37*** 
(0.06) 
Tamilnadu -1.05*** 
(0.23) 
-0.69*** 
(0.14) 
-0.65*** 
(0.10) 
-0.43*** 
(0.12) 
-0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
Meghalaya 0.33* 
(0.17) 
0.72 
(0.65) 
1.78*** 
(0.54) 
0.35** 
(0.14) 
1.17*** 
(0.14) 
0.79*** 
(0.17) 
Type of day: Normal and 
weekly variant 
0.12 
(0.12) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.42*** 
(0.09) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.18*** 
(0.04) 
Normal and Abnormal  -0.31 
(0.25) 
-0.19 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.21) 
-0.48*** 
(0.15) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.28*** 
(0.09) 
All three days 0.19 
(0.58 
-0.27 
(0.31) 
-0.40* 
(0.24) 
0.58*** 
(0.16) 
0.28 
(0.25) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
 
Weekly variant and 
abnormal 
-4.46* 
(2.67) 
0.99 
(1.60) 
-0.69 
(0.89) 
2.8** 
(1.35) 
-0.55** 
(0.18) 
0.89 
(0.10) 
Season:  
Winter 98-99 
0.36*** 
(0.13) 
0.56*** 
(0.13) 
0.60*** 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Summer 99 0.59*** 
(0.13) 
0.68*** 
(0.13) 
0.57*** 
(0.08) 
0.29*** 
(0.08) 
0.16*** 
(0.06) 
-0.002 
(0.04) 
Other 0.23 
(0.19) 
0.85*** 
(0.26) 
0.64*** 
(0.13) 
0.31** 
(0.14) 
0.17 
(0.13) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
Constant 7.58*** 
(0.74) 
5.12*** 
(0.52) 
6.73*** 
(0.36) 
1.83*** 
(0.41) 
1.35*** 
(0.32) 
1.10*** 
(0.18) 
N 1915 1926 6462 1915 1926 6462 
R2 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.75 0.85 0.86 
Notes: Hours of work include zeros, and measured by time spent on an “average day”. All work is the sum 
of care work  and income-earning work. Statistical significance of coefficients and difference in 
coefficients at 1, 5 and 10 percent represented by ***, **, * respectively. Parentheses contain 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Variables defined same as in notes of Table  1.4 	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Table 6: Summary of sample characteristics  
 All 
wives 
Wives without any other adult in household (except 
husband) 
At least one 
child aged 0-
5 and no 
child   6-17  
At least one 
child aged 0-5 
and at least 
one child 6-17 
No child aged 
0-5 and at 
least one child 
6-17 
No child 
aged 0-5 
and no 
child 6-17 
Frequency (N) 10263 1837 1717 1360 1348 
Dependent variables      
Mean hours of child 
care per day* 
0.8 1.6 1.1 0.3 0.1 
Mean hours of indirect 
care per day* 
6 6.2 6.6 6.5 5.9 
Independent variables      
Average no: of children 
aged 17 or below  
1.6 1.9 3.4 2  - 
             Sex ratio: girls         
                      per 1000 boys 
853 847 941 659 - 
Mean age of wives **  33.6 26.2 32.1 36.5 43.7 
% Wives with any 
income -earning hours  
74.6 68.8 78.4 78.5 73.9 
% Wives by education: 
Not literate 
65.3 61.2 68.3 59.5 70.2 
5th grade or below  23.7 25.2 22.3 27.3 21.9 
8th grade 6.7 7.8 5.4 7.9 5.7 
10th grade 2.8 3.5 2.5 3.4 1.6 
12th grade/higher  1.4 2.2 1.5 1.9 0.6 
% Wives by social 
group 
     
         Adivasi 18.3 23.5 20.8 16.3 18.1 
          Dalit 19.1 20.8 19.3 19.2 24.1 
          Any other 62.6 55.7 59.9 64.5 57.8 
% Wives who live in 
concrete house  
26 19.3 21.5 31.2 23 
% Wives in households 
with land >= 1 acre 
43.1 34.8 40 41.2 35.9 
       Mean land (acres) 1.7 1.4 2.1 1.8 1.4 
* Time use is measured as hours on an average day. ** Age is positively correlated with the age 
composition of children and not included in the model below.  
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Table 7: Multivariate regressions of mother’s hours of childcare on the gender and 
age composition of young children (continued onto next page) 	  
 Mother's hours of child 
care  
 
(1) 
Mother's hours of child care  
 
(2) 
Gender composition of young 
children 
  
Only one girl under 6 and no boys 0.87*** 
(0.05) 
0.83*** 
(0.05) 
Only one boy under 6 and no girls 0.91*** 
(0.05) 
0.88*** 
(0.05) 
Only two girls under 6 and no 
boys  
1.23*** 
(0.06) 
1.21*** 
(0.07) 
Only one girl and one boy under 6 1.42*** 
(0.06) 
1.38*** 
(0.06) 
Two girls under 6 and no boys  1.23*** 
(0.07) 
1.22*** 
(0.07) 
At least one child aged 6-17 is 
present  
-0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.17*** 
(0.03) 
Has non-zero income-earning 
hours 
 
 -0.37*** 
(0.04) 
Education    
Some schooling  0.02 
(0.03) 
Completed schooling  0.40** 
(0.19) 
Has higher education   0.01 
(0.05) 
Social Group    
Dalit  -0.04 
(0.05) 
Others  0.10** 
(0.05) 
Has 1 acre of land or more 
 
 0.02 
(0.03) 
Does not live in a mud house  
 
 -0.07* 
(0.04) 
Season    
Winter 1998-99  -0.08** 
(0.04) 
Summer 1999  -0.07* 
(0.04) 
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Other  0.06 
(0.08) 
Type of day   
Normal and Weekly Variant  0.01 
(0.03) 
Normal and Abnormal  0.12 
(0.09) 
Normal, Weekly Variant and 
Abnormal 
 0.14 
(0.13) 
Weekly Variant and Abnormal  -0.37 
(0.40) 
State   
Madhya Pradesh  -0.28*** 
(0.06) 
Gujarat  -0.02 
(0.07) 
Orissa  -0.09 
(0.07) 
Tamil Nadu  -0.24*** 
(0.06) 
Meghalaya  0.01 
(0.13) 
Constant  0.26*** 
(0.03) 
0.70** 
(0.09) 
N                 0.3       0.34 
R squared              6262       6262 
Notes: Hours of work include zeros, and measured by time spent on an “average day”. Statistical 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent represented by ***, **, * respectively. Parentheses contain 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The main categorical variable is the gender 
composition of young children and classifies mothers' by the gender composition of young 
children. While the categories relevant to the model/reported here are mothers who have one to 
two children, this variable also accounts for mothers who have 3, 4 and 5 children 0- 5 years or 6-
17 years respectively. The reference group is thus mothers who have no children 0-5 years or 6-17 
years respectively. Control variables are education (reference: not literate), social group 
(reference: Adivasi), has 1 acre of land or more (reference: less than 1 acre), does not live in mud 
house (reference: lives in mud house/partially concrete), season (reference: rainy season 1998), 
type of days (reference: all normal days), and state (reference: Haryana). 	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Table 8: Multivariate regression of mother's hours of childcare, and hours of 
indirect care respectively   on the gender and age composition of older children 
(continued onto next page) 	  
 Mother's 
hours of 
child care  
(1) 
Mother's 
hours of 
child care  
(2) 
Mother's 
hours of 
indirect care  
(3) 
Mother's 
hours of 
indirect care 
(4) 
Gender composition of older children      
Only one girl 6-17 years and no boys -0.11* 
(0.06) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.16 
(0.15) 
0.14 
(0.14) 
Only one boy 6-17 years and no girls -0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.40*** 
(0.11) 
0.43*** 
(0.10) 
Only two girls under 6-17 years and 
no boys  
-0.14** 
(0.07) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.26) 
0.12 
(0.24) 
Only one girl and one boy 6-17 years -0.19*** 
(0.06) 
-0.17*** 
(0.06) 
0.39** 
(0.16) 
0.44*** 
(0.15) 
Two girls 6-17 years and no boys  -0.23*** 
(0.06) 
-0.25*** 
(0.06) 
1.00** 
(0.15) 
0.89*** 
(0.14) 
Other	  Variables	   	   	   	   	  
At least one child aged 0-5 is present  1.20*** 
(0.03) 
1.17*** 
(0.03) 
0.19** 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
Has non-zero income-earning hours 
 
 -0.37*** 
(0.04) 
 -1.25*** 
(0.08) 
Education      
Some schooling  -0.01 
(0.03) 
 0.26*** 
(0.08) 
Completed schooling  0.32* 
(0.19) 
 0.14 
(0.35) 
Has higher education   -0.07 
(0.18) 
 -0.53 
(0.41) 
Social Group      
Dalit  -0.02 
(0.05) 
 0.17 
(0.12) 
Others  0.11** 
(0.05) 
 0.41*** 
(0.10) 
Has 1 acre of land or more 
 
 0.02 
(0.03) 
 0.29*** 
(0.07) 
Does not live in a mud house  
 
 -0.07* 
(0.04) 
 0.08 
(0.09) 
Season      
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Winter 1998-99  -0.08** 
(0.04) 
 0.85***	  
(0.09) 
Summer 1999  -0.05 
(0.04) 
 0.88*** 
(0.09) 
Other  0.07 
(0.08) 
 1.01*** 
(0.15) 
Type of day     
Normal and Weekly Variant  0.01 
(0.03) 
 -0.05 
(0.08) 
Normal and Abnormal  0.12 
(0.09) 
 0.05 
(0.22) 
Normal, Weekly Variant and 
Abnormal 
 0.08 
(0.12) 
 -0.20 
(0.29) 
Weekly Variant and Abnormal  -0.39 
(0.39) 
 -3.53 
(1.35) 
State     
Madhya Pradesh  -0.28*** 
(0.06) 
 -0.92*** 
(0.14) 
Gujarat  -0.02 
(0.07) 
 -0.57*** 
(0.14) 
Orissa  -0.12* 
(0.07) 
 0.12 
(0.16) 
Tamil Nadu  -0.30*** 
(0.06) 
 -1.77*** 
(0.13) 
Meghalaya  0.08 
(0.13) 
 -0.31 
(0.24) 
Constant  0.25*** 
(0.02) 
0.72** 
(0.09) 
6.02*** 
(0.07) 
6.79*** 
(0.18) 
N 0.27 0.31 0.02 0.17 
R squared 6262 6262 6262 6262 
Note: Hours of work include zeros, and measured by time spent on an “average day”. Statistical 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent represented by ***, **, * respectively. Parentheses contain 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The main categorical variable is the gender composition of 
older children and classifies mothers' by the gender composition of older children. While the categories 
relevant to the model/reported here are mothers who have one to two children, this variable also accounts 
for mothers who have 3, 4 and 5 children 0-5 years or 6-17 years respectively. The reference group is thus 
mothers who have no children 0-5 years or 6-17 years respectively. Controls variables are the same as those 
described in notes of Table 2.2 	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APPENDIX B 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: LOWESS plot of wives and husbands' hours of care work and of total 
work by own-children-to-adult ratios 
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Figure 2: LOWESS plot of wives and husbands' hours of care work and of total 
work by income-earning hours  
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Figure 3: Mother's average hours of child care and of indirect care by the age of 
their youngest child  
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Figure 4: LOWESS plots 2.1 and 2.2 of mothers' time to childcare by the presence 
and gender of young children and the number of older children  
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Figure 5: LOWESS plots 3.1 and 3.2 of mothers' time to childcare given the gender 
and number of older children and the presence of at least one young child  
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Figures 6: LOWESS plots 3.3 and 3.4 of mothers' time to indirect care given the 
gender and number of older children  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   92 
APPENDIX C 
 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 	   	  
C1:  Corresponding Definitions and Measures of Care Work from the ITUS 
Table 9 outlines the distinctions I make between care work and income earning 
work, and how these fit with paid and unpaid, SNA and non-SNA distinctions. Care work 
includes unpaid direct and indirect care (rows 1-2, Table 9). Direct care refers to the 
physical care of children, the sick, the elderly, the disabled, or family members, and 
indirect care refers to various household chores to assist in such caring such as meal 
preparation, cleaning, shopping for groceries etc. In rural areas, indirect care also 
includes SNA activities such as fetching drinking water, carrying loads of fuel wood and 
animal fodder, making "dung cakes" (fuel for earthen stoves), kitchen gardening, 
foraging for berries, fruits etc; tasks that are vital to preparing meals and supplementing 
them respectively.  
Beyond care work, there is income-earning work (Row 4, Table 9), but the 
boundaries between these are fuzzy (Row 3, Table 9).  In India, typically agricultural 
produce is typically divided into portions for home consumption and for sale in the 
market, but such produce was grown on the same plot of land. When activities such as 
sowing, weeding, etc are unpaid, they are unpaid because family members perform them. 
Yet the produce is at least partly, if not wholly for sale. Given the indivisibility of labor 
inputs, I place all unpaid and paid agricultural activities in income earning work but treat 
them as spanning unpaid and paid SNA activities (Row 3, columns 2 and 3). These 
demarcations are necessary for my analysis on how time to care work and income earning 
work reflect gender differences in the workday. 
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Table 9: Care work and Income earning work correspondence to Non-SNA and 
SNA work 	  
 Non-SNA work Unpaid SNA  Paid SNA 
Care work - Direct Care  
 
 
Care for the children, 
the sick, the elderly 
and disabled for own 
household, also 
accompanying adults 
to personal care 
services, care of guests 
and visitors to the 
household  
 ** 
Care work - Indirect care  
 
Cooking and serving 
food, etc, cleaning and 
upkeep of household, 
shopping for groceries, 
household planning, 
supervision, 
maintenance and 
management.  
 * Fetching water, fuel, 
fodder, Kitchen 
gardening, collecting 
fruits, and other minor 
forest produce, making 
dung cakes and wood 
chopping;  
Building and 
maintaining the 
homestead 
** 
Income-earning work and 
indirect care continuum  
 Agricultural and allied activities: 
Crop farming, animal husbandry, fishing, 
horticulture, processing of grains and 
storage, Fetching water, fuel, fodder, 
Kitchen gardening, collecting goods. 
  Construction of walls, 
fencing, roads etc 
Manufacturing, 
Construction, Trade, 
Business and Services 
Construction of 
walls, fencing, 
roads etc 
Manufacturing, 
Construction, 
Trade, Business 
and Services 
Income-earning work   
Note: * I assume that when these are unpaid they are for home consumption and locate them in 
indirect care. When these are paid, I include them in income-earning work like other agricultural and 
allied activities. ** Services also include domestic services such as nannying, cleaning, sweeping, which 
should be paid SNA and care work. However, such data in the ITUS is clubbed together with other "petty 
services" such as cobbler, plumber etc., as a result of which I cannot make distinction between paid care 
and unpaid care. 	  	  
Note that my treatment of agricultural work is different from my treatment of 
SNA activities such as fetching water, fuel, kitchen gardening, making dung cakes etc. 
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However, the Indian time use survey data itself show that fetching water etc are largely 
unpaid. The National Sample Surveys on consumption expenditure further show that 
almost a third of household needs of food, water, etc are met by unpaid work.  Thus I 
treat these activities as indirect care when unpaid because I assume they are directed 
towards home consumption. Otherwise, I treat them as income earning work. 
C2: Purposive sampling methodology for qualitative field research 
I used purposive stratified sampling to get my sample respondents. There were 
some differences in my sampling in BN and SN due to logistical difficulties and limited 
time. While the sample I gathered is not representative of each village, it is illustrative of 
gender differences in how married couples spend their days, and how each spouse 
perceived these differences. Villages in the Nimad region of Bagli, Madhya Pradesh are 
typically comprised of 50-250 households. Most of these villages are populated by 
various Adivasi tribes and located on undulating, sloping terrain of poor quality soil. The 
few villages with better soil and topography tended to be populated by a middle caste, 
known as Sirvis. BN is largely populated by Adivasis with less than 10% being Sirvis, 
Dalits and Muslims. SN is a wealthier village populated by both Sirvis (~50%) and 
Adivasis (~50%).  
 In BN, I interviewed couples from 30 households. My sampling frame was based 
on Self-Help Group (SHG) formation for the following reasons: (i) almost every 
household (co-residing; and eating from the same pot) had a female family member who 
belonged to SHGs (formed to facilitate group savings/loan activities), (ii) SHGs had 18- 
22 members each, all married women aged 55 and below, and (iii) each SHG was formed 
from the same community/tribes (Bhilala, Barela, Korku, Muslim, Dalit), among 
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households of similar economic status (just above the government poverty line, below it 
or well below it) and main source of livelihood (cultivation/wage labor/non-agricultural 
occupation). Of the 16-18 SHGs operating in the area, I picked five groups randomly to 
ensure adequate representation for economic status, main tribes, and religion/caste. 
Within each SHG, I divided members into four strata based on age group and position 
within family i.e. whether they were 20-35 or 35-55, either has daughters-in-law or is a 
daughter-in-law herself. I also distinguished whether a woman was single or not (migrant 
husband/widowed/ divorced/separated). I randomly picked 5-6 women in each SHG and 
strata, and interviewed them and their household members (typically husband, and in-
laws wherever applicable). Of these I had just 1 Dalit household. In addition, I randomly 
picked a middle caste household, as these formed the village merchant class and were not 
part of any SHG (7-8 out of approximately 200 households).  
 In SN, SHGs were not as widespread and hence my sampling frame came from 
asking key informants to name heads of households from landed agriculturists or non-
landed agriculturists from each community [(Sirvis (middle caste), and Korkus 
(Adivasi)]. Of the 40 households suggested, I contacted and interviewed about 11 middle 
castes and 14 Adivasi. Sirvis had larger, multi-generation households. In the Adivasi 
households, several younger family members in the Adivasi neighborhood had migrated 
away for the season. 
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C3: Method for calculating time spent in any activity 	   The ITUS has two features that are distinct from the typical design of other time 
use surveys, and these have to be taken into account while calculating average hours of 
work.  First, it defines three types of days - “normal”, “weekly variant” and “abnormal”- 
instead of the usual weekday and weekend distinction. Second, the Indian Time Use 
Survey has a distinct two-stage sampling procedure with the aim of getting as many non-
normal days as possible. These are explained in turn to explain why the algorithm used 
for calculating time spent in any activity used with the ITUS is the time spent on an 
"average day".  
 First, the three types of days: A normal day is supposed to constitute a typical, 
routine day working or studying as the case may be, and a weekly variant is some break 
in this routine that is not 'abnormal'. For a salaried employee with regular work, a normal 
day is a day when he/she goes to their place at his/her usual time and does his/her routine 
work. A weekly variant day would be the days off from the typical routine in a week. In 
contrast an abnormal day for such a person could consist of activities due to unforeseen 
circumstances such as taking a family member to the hospital, or due to social and 
cultural ceremonies that may call for different patterns of time use. The distribution of 
such days in a given week can vary for different persons.  
 Thus, the second unique and salient feature of the ITUS - whereas national time 
use surveys in other countries collect only one “diary day” per person, the ITUS has 
anywhere between one to three diary days per person. In general, the “diary day” is time 
use data collected over 24 hours for regular intervals (15 minutes to an hour). Such diary 
days are typically collected to represent every day of the week. The number of actual 
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days sampled in the ITUS depends on how respondents answer the question about how 
many days of each type of day they had in the previous week. Those who reported only 
one type of day were surveyed once for that type of day, and those who reported two (or 
three) types of days were surveyed for two (or three) diary days corresponding to the type 
of days reported.  For instance, a person who reports 7 normal days in the previous week 
only has a normal day surveyed. A person who reports 6 normal and 1 abnormal is 
surveyed for an abnormal day and a normal day, and so on. However, each person can 
have only one normal day, one weekly variant or one abnormal day at the most. 
 This two-stage sampling strategy to collect diary days has several implications for 
the dataset and the methods used to calculate average hours worked (See Table 10 
below). First, as each person has more than one type of day, the total number of days in 
the sample (61245) is greater than the total number of persons sampled (43257) (last row, 
third and last column). This is distinct from other time use surveys where there is only 
one diary day per person, and the sample of persons is also the sample of days.  However, 
second, respondents who were surveyed on more than one day surveyed are approached 
on distinct types of day without repetition. That is, respondents who were surveyed on 
more than one day cannot have more than one normal, or weekly variant, or abnormal 
day. Thus the total number of days surveyed for a given type, say normal is the same of 
the number of persons who report a normal day i.e. 43189 (Row 1). 
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Table 10: Numbers and share of each type of day in the total number of days in the 
previous week and in actual days sampled 	  
Day  No: of days reported in the 
previous week by all persons1 
No: of days surveyed Number of 
persons 
corresponding to 
each type of day N % N % 
Normal 283107 93.3 43189 70.5 43189 
Weekly variant 18129 6.0 16325 26.7 16325 
Abnormal  2188 0.7 1731 2.8 1731 
Total 303424 100.0 61245 100.0 43257 
Note: No: of days reported in the previous week by all persons = Σ n f(n), where n is the number of 
days of given type and f(n) is the frequency of persons who report n days in the previous week.  	  
Finally, the share of non-normal days is much greater in the sample than what is reported 
in the previous week (columns 2 and 4). This was to ensure that there was sufficient 
representation of non-normal days.  
These quirks have to be taken into account while calculating average hours 
worked and measuring the gender differences in average hours worked. Typically, if 
diary days were a pure random sample, then the share of different type of days in the 
sample would reflect this proportion in the population too. In turn, the proportion of 
different types of days can be used to weight average hours worked at the individual or 
aggregate levels. However, as non-normal days have been “over-sampled”, it is more 
appropriate to use the responses to number of days in the previous week as weights to 
calculate average hours worked by each person. This method involves constructing each 
person's average day and then getting the sample mean of average days over all persons. 
That is, a per person metric that takes into account each person having more than one day 
surveyed and the oversampling of non-normal days.   
Thus, hours worked on the average day = 1/7 Σ i  tijdij  ,where j denote respondents 
and j = 1,N (total sample size),   i is the type of day and i= normal, weekly variant and 
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abnormal days respectively,  tij  the time spent working by the jth respondent on an ith 
day, dij the number of i days the jth respondent had in the previous week.  
In published papers that use the ITUS, average hours worked is usually measured 
as the sample average of respondents weekly hours i.e. 1/N Σ j [Σ i  tijdij ].  
Here, I use the average hours worked on an average day = 1/N Σ j [ 1/7 Σ i  tijdij ] 
C4: Age limits 	   The lower age limit tends to be 15 corresponding to the lower limit of typical 
childbearing age (15-65). Upper age limits are set as there tend to be more women than 
men in older age groups, which biases measures of gender differences. While the age cap 
typically used is 65, in the ITUS, the age limit for the working population should be 15-
75 because respondents in the age range 65-75 work non-trivial number of hours and 
have a high participation rate (82-85%) (see Table 11 below). For my analysis, I used a 
sample restricted only to married couples, the household and spouse of the household 
head who are 15 years and older. There are 12 women and 78 men who are aged 76 or 
older. Analysis excluding the couples to which these women and men belong made no 
difference to my results. For these reasons I did not impose upper age limits in the 
restricted sample that I used.  
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Table 11. Gender difference in average hours worked and sex-ratio of sample by age 
groups 	  
Panel A: Including zero values   
Age 
range 
Average Hours worked Gender difference in 
average hours 
worked 
    
Men Women 
6-10 0.68 1.08 0.40     
10-15 1.77 3.15 1.38     
15-50 8.08 9.84 1.76     
50-65 7.89 8.16 0.27     
65-75 5.46 5.23 -0.23     
75 + 2.32 2.37 0.05     
All 6.61 8.11 1.5     
Panel B: Excluding zero values   
Age 
range 
Average hours worked  % Working of all 
surveyed 
Gender 
difference in 
average hours 
worked 
Ratio of all 
women to 
all men 
surveyed  
Total 
population
surveyed 
Men Women Men Women 
6-10 1.99 2.11 34.1 51.0 0.12 0.81 3155 
10-15 3.15 3.96 56.3 79.3 0.81 0.88 4899 
15-50      8.46      9.92 95.3 98.9 1.46 0.98 27639 
50-65 8.21 8.37 95.8 97.2 0.16 0.91 5536 
65-75 6.57 6.12 82.9 85.0 -0.45 0.84 1563 
75 + 4.32 4.47 53.7 52.8 0.15 0.89 463 
All 7.72 8.73 85.1 92.3 1.01 0.94 43257 
Note: Gender differences reported = female average hours – male average hours, average hours is average 
of hours worked on average day 	   	  
	  
C5: Supervisory Care 
 Mothers of young children especially those aged 5 and below are bound to be 
responsible for their children for most, if not all of the time, and supervisory care should 
be high for such mothers.  Apart from the dependency specific to young children, there 
are two reasons why supervisory care should be much larger in rural India.  
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Table 12: Levels and distribution of main components of care work and total care 
work hours for wives of household heads with and without children aged 0 to 5 
years  	  
 Mean 
(SD) 
Min 25th 
Percentile 
Median 75th 
Percentile 
Max 
I. Wives with at least one child aged 0-5 years 
(N=4359) 
Total care work 7.8 
(2.8) 
0 5.8 8 9.9 20.8 
Indirect care work 6.4 
(2.4) 
0 4.8 6.4 8 18.9 
Direct care work 
 
1.4 
(1.3) 
0 0.2 1.1 2.1 10.2 
      Child care  1.3 
(1.3) 
0 0.1 1.1 2 9.5 
      Supervisory care  0.2 
(0.5) 
0 0 0 0 5.7 
      Other direct care  0.1 
(0.3) 
0 0 0 0 9 
II. Wives without any children aged 0-5 years 
(N=5930) 
Total care work 6.1 
(2.8) 
0 4 6 8.2 18 
Indirect care work 5.7 
(2.8) 
0 3.8 5.6 7.8 18 
Direct care work 
 
0.4 
(0.9) 
0 0 0 0.1 10 
      Child care  0.3 
(0.9) 
0 0 0 0 10 
      Supervisory care  0.1 
(0.5) 
0 0 0 0 10 
      Other direct care  0.1 
(0.3) 
0 0 0 0 7.5 
Notes: Total care work is the sum of indirect care and direct care. Direct care is composed of childcare and 
other direct care, and supervisory care is a subset of childcare. Time spent on specific categories is hours 
spent on an average day of the week 	  
 One, rural India is characterized by poor access to public or private childcare 
services. Two, more than 80 percent of rural Indian women who engage in income-
earning work do so in the agricultural sector. Such women work either on their family 
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farms or as wage laborers; occupations where women are likely to have young children 
accompany them unless there are substitute caregivers in the immediate and/or extended 
family. Indeed, one could argue that hours of indirect care are likely to be the lower 
bound for true values of supervisory care and childcare. However, Table 12 shows that 
the levels and distribution of total care work for wives of household heads disaggregated 
by whether they have young children or not shows that even mothers of children aged 0-5 
have implausibly low levels of supervisory care.  For mothers with children aged 0-5, 
childcare has a minimum of zero and the 1st percentile is 1 hour. However supervisory 
care has largely zero values and only the 99th percentile is 1 hour. As childcare is 
composed of both hands-on childcare and supervisory care, the low figures for 
supervisory care indicate that childcare figures are underestimated for most women in the 
ITUS. Nevertheless, the ITUS does capture important aspects of hands-on child care, and 
indirect care both of which are higher for wives with children aged 0 to 5 years than 
wives without such children in every part of the distribution (see second row of Panel I 
and II, and third row of panel I and II, Table 12). 	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